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Introduction 
The magnitude of the consequences corruption may bring not only in the functioning of the 
public administration but also in the everyday life of the citizens was the reason that prompted 
me to deal with the issue of corruption in my thesis. Every now and then new cases of 
corruption see the light of day and the frequency with which they occur was the cause that 
intrigued me to further examine this issue. In addition, the complexity of corruption (V.Tanzi, 
1998) and the many forms it takes (United Nations Handbook On Practical Anti-Corruption 
Measures For Prosecutors and Investigators, 2004) made it necessary to narrow the scope of 
my research. The selection of the scope was not random though, since it is targeted at the 
most corrupt area of the public administration, this of public procurement. 
The analysis of some basic terms and procedures in public procurement as presented in  
Chapter I. may be helpful in grasping the general idea about how procurement in the public 
sector works. An as much as possible thorough analysis of procurement provides the basic 
knowledge of the field, knowledge with which we need to be equipped to understand where 
corruption arises. Moving on in Chapter II. drawing attention to the issue of corruption, the 
causes that create it and the effects it entail is an attempt to analyse the term and emphasise 
the gravity of the situation on the social, political and economic level. Which sectors suffer 
most from corruption and which countries afflicts more than others are central questions that 
will also be examined. By analysing corruption in the public procurement cycle the risks that 
emerge in the 3 stages of the cycle (the pre-tendering, the tendering and the post-tendering) 
will be presented, by the same time the ground for the following chapter will be prepared. It 
would be ineffective to design policies and measures for tackling corruption without adapting 
the decision-making procedure to the risks that have to be confronted. Thus, Chapter III. will 
attempt to associate the risks and pathologies of the administration with the appropriate 
solutions. It will highlight the policies and measures that may generally combat corruption in 
the public administration and consequently in public procurement, as an integral part of it. 
Except for measures that may reform the public administration, it will make a reference to the 
specific anti-corruption measures in the public procurement cycle that, if adopted, may 
contribute to the prevention and combat of corruption, as well as to the public procurement 
process reform. 
Hence, the purpose of the present thesis is to examine the relation between corruption and 
procurement, the procedures that favour corruption and the risks that may generate it. The 
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thesis will not be limited to the presentation of the different aspects of the problem, but an 
attempt will be made to underline the measures that need to be taken to eliminate corruption. 
Approaching corruption both theoretically and practically is indispensable for creating a 
comprehensive and thorough proposal. 
CHAPTER I 
Public Procurement 
I. Definitions and significance of public procurement 
To be able to examine how corruption could be dealt effectively, at first, it is necessary to 
define some basic terms concerning the procedure of public procurement and also make a 
reference to the reasons that render public procurement so important a field in public 
administration. 
By defining the meaning of public procurement, the significance of procurement in the public 
administration is revealed. According to the OECD, ‘Public procurement refers to the 
purchase by governments and state-owned enterprises of goods, services and works’1. The 
field of procurement plays a determinant role in the public administration, inasmuch as it 
needs the goods, services and works for its functioning. Another wording of the term, 
provided by the European Commission, defines it as ‘the process by which public authorities, 
such as government departments or local authorities, purchase work, goods or services from 
companies’2 . According to the Directive 2014/24/EU, the term procurement  means ‘the 
acquisition by means of a public contract of works, supplies or services by one or more 
contracting authorities from economic operators chosen by those contracting authorities, 
whether or not the works, supplies or services are intended for a public purpose’3 (Article 1, 
paragraph 2). In the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, it is defined as follows 
‘’‘Procurement’ or ‘Public Procurement’ means the acquisition of goods, construction or 
                                                           
1Published in the OECD site, http://www.oecd.org/gov/public-procurement/, (latest access 16.04.2018) 
2Published in the European Commission site, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement_el ,  
(latest access 16.04.2018) 
3Directive 2014/24/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, published in EUR-Lex site, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0024&from=EN, (latest access 16.04.2018) 
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services by a procuring entity’’ (Article 2, paragraph (j)) 4 . These definitions provide 
information about the actors involved, as well as about the object of the transaction. 
The procedure evolves with the interaction of the Contracting Authorities, the Economic 
Operators and the Central Purchasing Body. According to the definitions provided by the 
2014/24/EU Directive, the term CAs refers to ‘the State, regional or local authorities, bodies 
governed by public law or associations formed by one or more such authorities or one or more 
such bodies governed by public law’ (Article 2, paragraph 1 (1)). As far as the EOs are 
concerned, these are ‘any natural or legal person or public entity or group of such persons 
and/or entities, including any temporary association of undertakings, which offers the 
execution of works and/or a work, the supply of products or the provision of services on the 
market’ (Article 2, paragraph 1 (10)). The third actor is the CPB, which is ‘a contracting 
authority providing centralised purchasing activities and, possibly, ancillary purchasing 
activities’ (Article 2, paragraph 1 (16))5. The CPB buys, stocks and resells the goods that the 
CA/s need/s and also act/s as a mediator for the award of the contracts, the operation of 
dynamic purchasing systems and the conclusion of framework agreements6. Its role is crucial 
for the accomplishment of the process since it facilitates the cooperation and the interaction 
between the main actors of the procurement process. 
The procurement goals and policies vary from country to country since they are economically, 
socially and politically differentiated from each other7. The economic, social and political 
situation of a country demonstrates the needs for procurement for the achievement of which 
the formation of the appropriate policies is necessary. Despite the differences, the impact of 
public procurement on the economy may be examined by the amount of money allocated in 
it8. According to the latest OECD 2013 data, procurement consisted the ‘12% of GDP and 
29% of general government expenditure in OECD countries amounting to EUR 4.2 trillion’ 
                                                           
4UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, United Nations, 2014, published in the UNCITRAL site, 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement-2011/2011-Model-Law-on-Public-
Procurement-e.pdf , (latest access 16.04.2018)  
5
 Directive 2014/24/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, published in EUR-Lex site, pg.32-33, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0024&from=EN, (latest access 27.04.2018) 
6
 Directive 2014/24/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, published in EUR-Lex site, pg.13, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0024&from=EN, (latest access 27.04.2018) 
7Khi V. Thai, Public Procurement Re-examined, Journal of Public Procurement, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2001, pg.26, 
http://ippa.org/jopp/download/vol1/Thai.pdf,   (latest access 18.04.2018)  
8Khi V. Thai, Public Procurement Re-examined, Journal of Public Procurement, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2001 pg.24, 
http://ippa.org/jopp/download/vol1/Thai.pdf, (latest access 20.04.2018) 
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(Figure 1.)9. As long as the budget aims at the accomplishment of the objectives of the public 
administration 10 , in case of misallocation or abuse these objectives are automatically 
distorted. Consequently, a misallocation of public expenditure may not only lead to an 
ineffective public administration-as the funds will not be allocated in areas where necessary- 
but it may also lead to the waste of public funds11. As mentioned in the EU Anticorruption 
Report 2014 the impact of corruption on the economy is difficult to be calculated but based on 
‘on estimates by specialised institutions and bodies’, the economic cost for the EU is  
estimated to be ‘EUR 120 billion per year, just a little less than the annual budget of the 
European Union’12. Taking into account that the resources provided for the procurement 
constitute public expenditure, which means that they derive from tax revenue13, the allocation 
of public funds should be rational, cover the real needs of the public administration and 
ensure the public interest. 
Another reason why the public procurement field is considered of paramount importance is 
the fact that it contributes to the development of the society and nation by the capacity it has 
to make society better through its policies. The goals set and also the way the public 
procurement is fulfilled affect the country’s development. This may be achieved by applying 
policies targeted towards social responsibility and particularly on the four areas of social 
responsibility: a) the economic responsibility, b) legal responsibility c) ethical responsibility 
and d) philanthropic responsibility. These four areas include the maximisation of profit, the 
obedience to rules, the respect and protection of human rights, the treatment of people with 
dignity and respect, as well as the protection of the environment (e-procurement). Whether or 
not the public sector provides its procurement by EOs who infringe human rights and adopt as 
a philosophy for their functioning 'child labour, excessive work hours, paying less than a 
                                                           
9 Preventing Corruption in Public Procurement, OECD, 2016, published in the OECD site, pg5, 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/public-procurement/publications/Corruption-Public-Procurement-Brochure.pdf , (latest 
access 20.04.2018)  
10J.-W. Choi, A study of the role of public procurement-can public procurement make society better?, pg.5, 
http://www.ippa.org/IPPC4/Proceedings/13ProcurementPreferences/Paper13-4.pdf, (latest access 20.04.2018) 
11 Enhancing Integrity In Public Procurement: A Checklist, 2008, published in the OECD site, pg8, 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/41760991.pdf , (latest access 17.04.2018) 
12
 EU Anti-corruption Report COM(2014) 38 final: Report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, February 2014, Brussels, published in the EU Commission Migration and Home Affairs 
site, pg.3, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-
and-human-trafficking/corruption/docs/acr_2014_en.pdf, (latest access 24.09.2018) 
13J.-W. Choi, A study of the role of public procurement-can public procurement make society better?, pg.1, 
http://www.ippa.org/IPPC4/Proceedings/13ProcurementPreferences/Paper13-4.pdf, (latest access 20.04.2018) 
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living wage, gender inequity and any other forms of exploitation'14 plays a key role in its 
progress and the principles that it represents to the society. Avoiding taking measures to 
protect the environment or measures to prevent corrupt practices that may diminish the 
quality of procurement have also an impact on society. On the contrary, measures that respect 
human rights, combat corruption, protect the environment and promote competition should be 
at the core of the designed policies for combating and therefore for reforming the field. In 
addition, the public entities should stimulate companies to adopt the ‘SR agenda’ and the 
governments should ‘define minimum standards for business performance embedded within 
the legal framework’. Social responsibility includes also an ethical aspect, which is the 
obligation of abiding to principles, such as the non-discrimination, the equal treatment and the 
transparency principles. Given the fact that SMB firms are not that powerful ‘to compete 
against big companies’, governments should assist them for their development and growth15. 
Indeed, inclusion is part of the Europe 2020 strategy which aims at achieving ‘smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth while ensuring the most efficient use of public funds’. This 
may be attained by ‘the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in public 
procurement’ and by enabling ‘procurers to make better use of public procurement in support 
of common societal goals’16. Smart growth stands for development ‘based on knowledge and 
innovation’, sustainable growth for ‘a more resource efficient, greener and more competitive 
economy’ and inclusive growth for ‘fostering a high-employment economy delivering social 
and territorial cohesion’17. From all these the view of Arrowsmith (1998) that the field of 
public procurement can be considered as a means of ‘achieving economic, social and other 
objectives’18 may be confirmed. 
                                                           
14J.-W. Choi, A study of the role of public procurement-can public procurement make society better?, pg.2,8, 
http://www.ippa.org/IPPC4/Proceedings/13ProcurementPreferences/Paper13-4.pdf, (latest access 20.04.2018) 
15J.-W. Choi, A study of the role of public procurement-can public procurement make society better?, pg.8-10, 
http://www.ippa.org/IPPC4/Proceedings/13ProcurementPreferences/Paper13-4.pdf, (latest access 20.04.2018) 
 
16Directive 2014/24/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, published in EUR-Lex site, pg.1, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0024&from=EN, (latest access 16.05.2018) 
 
17 EUROPE 2020:A European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, Brussels, 3.3.2010 
COM(2010) 2020 final, published in the EUR-Lex site, pg.5, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC2020&from=en, (latest access 16.05.2018) 
18Khi V. Thai, Public Procurement Re-examined, Journal of Public Procurement, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2001,  
pg.25, http://ippa.org/jopp/download/vol1/Thai.pdf, (latest access 20.04.2018) 
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Thus, the importance of public procurement is utterly linked to the provision of entities with 
the necessary means for their functioning, the fact that public funds are at stake and the 
country’s orientation and progress. 
II. The public procurement procedure 
i. The legal framework 
The legal framework for public procurement consists of the following international legal 
instruments: the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the World Trade 
Organisation Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), the International Labour 
Organisation’s Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention and the Directives of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Procurement19. To describe the procurement 
procedure reference will be made to the current EU directives, that is the Directive 
2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement and the 
Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the award of 
concession contracts and to the UNCITRAL. 
ii. The public procurement cycle 
There is a certain procedure in public administration that the CAs should follow to obtain the 
goods, services and works they need for their functioning. The public procurement process is 
cracked by the OECD into three stages: the pre-tendering stage, the tendering stage and the 
post-tendering stage20; whereas the TI divides the process in four stages by labeling them as: 
the planning stage, the bidding stage, the bid-evaluation stage and the implementation and 
monitoring stage21. Except for the labeling of the stages, the phases are the same and nothing 
changes in the essence of the procedure. The main difference is that the TI considers the 
bidding and the bid-evaluation stage as two separate stages, while the OECD includes both in 
                                                           
19
 Enhancing Integrity in Public Procurement: A Checklist, OECD, 2008, published in the OECD site, pg.5, 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/41760991.pdf,  (latest access 20.04.2018) 
 
20Enhancing Integrity in Public Procurement: A Checklist, OECD, 2008, published in the OECD site, pg.10, 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/41760991.pdf,  (latest access 20.04.2018) 
21S. Kühn, L. B. Sherman, Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement: A Practical Guide, 2014, published in 
the Transparency International site,pg.7, 
http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2014_anticorruption_publicprocureme?e=2496456/8718192, 
(latest access 20.04.2018) 
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the tendering stage. For the purposes of this dissertation though, the analysis of the process 
will be made upon the OECD labeling. 
-The Pre-tendering and Tendering Stages 
Pre-tendering  stage: -needs assessment 
                                     -planning and budgeting                     
                                     -definition of requirements              phases 
                                     -choice of procedures 
 
The process starts with the pre-tendering stage and the first phase included is the needs 
assessment phase. The deficiencies of the CA/s are observed and the needs for procurement 
are determined. Having identified the needs, the following step is to conduct a plan about the 
way procurement will take place and draw up the budget for its realisation, which is called the 
planning and budgeting phase22. 
The CA/s then has/have to publish a contract notice to inform the interested EOs about the 
current opportunity for procuring so as to submit their tenders (Article 49). As listed in the 
Annex V part C of the Directive 2014/24/EU, inter alia it describes the procurement, the 
procedure that will be followed, the tools of procurement and it sets the time limits ‘for 
receipt of tenders (open procedures) or requests to participate (restricted procedures, 
competitive procedures with negotiation, dynamic purchasing systems, competitive dialogues, 
innovation partnerships)’. It is also in the contract notices that the criteria are described23, with 
the definition of requirements being part of the pre-tendering stage. Necessary for setting the 
terms according to which the process will be conducted, these criteria describe the required 
technical, selection and award criteria of the tenderers and the tenders they submit24. For the 
suppliers or contractors to be able to participate in tendering, they have to comply with a 
series of certain criteria imposed by the CA/s. These ‘selection criteria’ are divided by the EU 
                                                           
22
 Enhancing Integrity in Public Procurement: A Checklist,OECD, 2008, published in the OECD site, pg.10, 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/41760991.pdf, (latest access 20.04.2018) 
23
 Directive 2014/24/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, published in the EUR-Lex site, pg.60, 148-150, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0024&from=EN, (latest access 20.04.2018)  
 
24Enhancing Integrity in Public Procurement: A Checklist, OECD, 2008, published in the OECD site, pg.29,  
http://www.oecd.org/gov/41760991.pdf, (latest access 20.04.2018) 
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in three basic categories and precisely the ‘suitability to pursue the professional activity’, the 
‘economic and financial standing’ and the ‘technical and professional ability’ (Article 58, 
paragraph 1)25. Another precondition related to law is the ‘legal capacity’ of the EOs for the 
engagement in a ‘procurement contract’, as well as the absence of any criminal record 
((Article 9, paragraph 2 (c) & (f)). The implementation of ‘ethical and other standards 
applicable in this State’ is also a precondition for the acceptance of participation (Article 9, 
paragraph 2 (b))26. Regarding the criteria of suitability, the EO/s might have ‘to be enrolled in 
one of the professional or trade registers’ to prove their professional activity (Article 58, 
paragraph 2). The economic situation is important as well, since it indicates whether the 
supplier has ‘the necessary economic and financial capacity to perform the contract’ via for 
example the provision of ‘information on their annual accounts’ (Article 58, paragraph 3)27. 
Therefore, the EO/s should be economically able to undertake the contract and consequently, 
not being bankrupt or owing ‘taxes and social security contributions’ (Article 9, paragraph 2 
(d) & (e))28. As far as the technical and professional ability is concerned, the CA/s may 
‘impose requirements’ on the EO/s related to ‘human and technical resources and experience 
to perform the contract to an appropriate quality standard’ (Article 58, paragraph 4)29. In 
addition to this, they should possess ‘professional, technical and environmental qualifications, 
professional and technical competence, financial resources, equipment and other physical 
facilities, managerial capability, reliability, experience and personnel to perform the 
procurement contract’ (Article 9, paragraph 2 (a))30. 
                                                           
25Directive 2014/24/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, published in EUR-Lex site, pg.65, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0024&from=EN, (latest access 16.05.2018) 
26UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, United Nations, 2014, published in the UNCITRAL site, 
pg.10, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement-2011/2011-Model-Law-on-Public-
Procurement-e.pdf , (latest access 16.05.2018)  
27Directive 2014/24/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, published in the EUR-Lex site, pg.65, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0024&from=EN, (latest access 16.05.2018)  
28UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, United Nations, 2014, published in the UNCITRAL site, 
pg.10, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement-2011/2011-Model-Law-on-Public-
Procurement-e.pdf , (latest access 16.05.2018)  
29Directive 2014/24/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, published in the EUR-Lex site, pg.66, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0024&from=EN, (latest access 16.05.2018) 
30 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, published in the UNCITRAL site, pg.9, 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement-2011/2011-Model-Law-on-Public-
Procurement-e.pdf, (latest access 16.05.2018)  
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There are also certain criteria upon which the CA/s will base the award of a concession to an 
EO/s and these should be included in the definition of requirements phase as well. The tender 
has to comply ‘with the minimum requirements set’ by the CA/s and the tenderer to comply 
‘with the conditions for participation’ (Article 37, paragraph 1 (a) & (b)), such as ‘the 
professional and technical ability and the financial and economic standing of the candidates or 
tenderers’ (Article 38, paragraph 1). Additionally, for the award of a contract to a tenderer not 
being ‘excluded from participating in the award procedure’ (Article 37, paragraph 1(c)), inter 
alia on the grounds of corruption, fraud, money laundering or in case of bankruptcy or 
‘violation of applicable obligations’ (Article 38, paragraph 4 (b) & (c) & (e), paragraph 7 (a) 
& (b)) is necessary. Furthermore, the criteria for the award of concessions should be objective 
and ‘comply with the principles’ (Article 41, paragraph 1) of equal treatment, non-
discrimination during the award procedure and of transparency during and also after the 
‘performance of the contract’ (Article 3, paragraph 3 (1) & (2)). They might also be based on 
environmental, innovative or social criteria and the CA/s ‘shall list the criteria in descending 
order of importance’ (Article 41, paragraph 3)31. 
The purpose of the criteria of participation and award is to ensure the objective and unbiased 
conduct of the procedure that is why they should be explicitly defined in the solicitation 
documents. Also, they intend to verify the tenderer’s professional, economic, legal and 
technical capacity to fulfill the contract and that the tender submitted is proportionate to the 
needs and requirements of the CA/s. 
The last phase of the pre-tendering stage is the choice of procedures via which the 
procurement will be accomplished. Depending on the type of the procurement there are five 
main procedures that the CA may choose to follow: the open procedures, the restricted 
procedures, the competitive dialogue procedures, the competitive procedure with negotiation 
the innovative partnership procedure, the request for quotations, the request for proposals 
without negotiation and the single-source procurement32. It should be mentioned that the CA/s 
shall send invitations ‘simultaneously and in writing’ to ‘invite the selected candidates to 
                                                           
31
 DIRECTIVE 2014/23/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 26 February 
2014 on the award of concession contracts, published in the  EUR-Lex site, pg.19, 35-39, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0023&qid=1535473117745&from=EN, (latest 
access: 27.07.2018) 
 
32
 Public Procurement: Public Procurement Procedures, Brief 10, September 2016, published in the SIGMA 
site, pg.2, http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/Public-Procurement-Policy-Brief-10-200117.pdf, (latest access 
27.07.2018) 
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submit their tenders or, in the case of a competitive dialogue, to take part in the dialogue’ 
(Article 54, paragraph 1)33. 
Open procedures 
In the open procedures, ‘any interested economic operator may submit a tender in response to 
a call for competition’ (Article 27, paragraph 1, of the 2014/24/EU Directive)34 and they 
‘should constitute the norm’ as they have the advantage of increasing competition and 
achieving ‘better prices for the contracting authorities when purchasing goods in large 
volumes’35. The EOs should submit the ‘required documents’ and also ‘meet the selection 
criteria’ for the CA then to evaluate the tenders ‘on the basis of the most economically 
advantageous tender’ 36 . They are ‘generally suitable for routine, straightforward and 
commodity-type purchases’37. 
 Open tendering: According to the UNCITRAL, in the open tendering procedure, the 
CA/s should publish an invitation to tender (Article 36), and then provide the 
solicitation documents only to the suppliers that respond to the invitation (Article 38). 
These documents contain inter alia the ‘instructions for preparing tender’, ‘the criteria 
and procedures’, ‘the requirements as to documentary evidence’, ‘a detailed 
description of the subject matter of the procurement’, ‘the terms and conditions of the 
procurement contract’,  ‘the currency’, ‘the language or languages’, as well as ‘the 
manner, place and deadline for presenting tenders’ (Article 39 (a),(b),(c),(d),(e) & 
(m)). Following the guidelines of the solicitation documents, the tenders should 
submit their tender in ‘writing, signed’ form and the CA/s ‘shall preserve the security, 
                                                           
33
 Directive 2014/24/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, published in the EUR-Lex site, pg.62, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0024&from=EN,  (latest access 30.04.2018) 
 
34
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integrity and confidentiality of a tender and shall ensure that the content of the tender 
is examined only after it is opened’ (Article 40, paragraph 2(a) & (c)). After this 
phase where the tenders have been submitted, they have to be opened and evaluated. 
The deadline that has been set for the submission is also the date the tenders will be 
opened (Article 42, paragraph 1). The successful tender will be the one ‘with the 
lowest tender price’ and ‘the most advantageous tender ascertained on the basis of the 
criteria and procedures for evaluating tenders’ (Article 43, paragraph 3 (b (i) & (ii))38. 
The CA/s may choose to conduct the procurement by making use of an open procedure due to 
the increased competition and the transparency of the procedure, since ‘the contracting 
authority has no discretion in selecting a provider’. On the other hand, if the procedure is not 
conducted electronically it costs to ‘issue full tender documents to all parties’ and it also costs 
in time and money to evaluate all the tenders submitted 39. 
Restricted Procedures 
In contrast with the open procedures, any EO may request to participate in a competition, the 
CA/s should then assess the information, but ‘only those economic operators invited […] may 
submit a tender’ (Article 28, paragraphs 1 & 2, of the 2014/24/EU Directive)40.  This type of 
procurement ‘can also be used for routine, straightforward and commodity-type purchases 
where the contracting authority is of the view that benefits will be derived from limiting the 
number of tenderers’ but it ‘is particularly suited to more complex procurement and to non-
routine purchasing’41. 
 Restricted Tendering: The UNICITRAL provides that in this method, the CA ‘shall 
solicit tenders from all suppliers and contractors from which the subject matter of the 
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procurement is available’ (Article 34, paragraph 1 (a)). As for the contents of the 
solicitation documents, the presentation and the evaluation of tenders, the same 
applies as with the open tendering procedure (Article 45, paragraph 2)42. 
This type of procurement reduces the costs in money and also the time needed for the 
evaluation of tenders, since it is targeted only at the evaluation of those EOs that are suitable 
with the CA’s needs and criteria. The negative aspect of this type is ‘the increased exercise of 
discretion by the contracting authority’43. 
 
Negotiated Procedures 
The negotiated procedures ‘are procedures for the award of public contracts whereby 
contracting authorities consult contractors of their choice and negotiate the terms of the 
contract with one or more of them’. One kind of negotiated procedure is the negotiated 
procedures with prior notification that consists of two rounds, where in the first round ‘all 
interested contractors may submit their tenders and the contracting authority selects which of 
the candidates will be invited to negotiate’ and in the second one ‘negotiations with various 
candidates take place and the successful tender is selected’. The other kind is the negotiated 
procedures without prior notification that includes one single round and the CA/s may 
‘choose whichever contractor they want, begin negotiations directly with this contractor and 
award the contract to him’44. 
-Negotiations with prior notification: 
 Competitive procedure with negotiation: The CA/s having advertised the ‘contract 
opportunity’ expects from the EOs to submit the ‘pre-qualification and selection stage 
information, which is used by the contracting authority to establish whether the 
economic operators are qualified to perform the contract’ 45 . According to the 
2014/24/EU Directive, ‘any economic operator may submit a request to participate’ 
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(Article 29, paragraph 1) but in negotiations will proceed ‘only those economic 
operators invited by the contracting authority following its assessment of the 
information provided’ to ‘submit an initial tender which will be the basis for the 
subsequent negotiations’(Article 29, paragraph 2). It is a two-stage process and the 
evaluation is based on ‘the most economically advantageous tender46. 
 Request for proposals with consecutive negotiations: This procedure also prescribes 
prior publication as concluded from Article 47, paragraph 1 of the UNCITRAL47. The 
same provisions related to the request for proposals, the examination and evaluation of 
‘the technical, quality and performance characteristics of proposals’ that apply for the 
request for proposals without negotiation, is also applicable in this method (Article 50, 
paragraph 1). Responsive proposals are considered those ‘whose technical, quality and 
performance characteristics meet or exceed the relevant minimum requirements’ 
(Article 50, paragraph 2). The CA shall inform the tenderers about their score in the 
previously mentioned characteristics and ‘invite the supplier or contractor that has 
attained the best ranking’ (Article 50, paragraph 2 (a) & (b)). The CA invites at first 
the one with the best ranking to participate in negotiations and they negotiate in order 
to conclude a contract. If the CA fails in reaching a contract with the first one, then it 
proceeds by inviting the following ones in the rating list, up to the level the contract is 
concluded (Article 50, paragraph 3 & 4). It should be noticed that the CA is not 
allowed to ‘reopen negotiations with any supplier or contractor with which it has 
terminated negotiations’ (Article 50, paragraph 6)48. 
-Negotiations without prior notification: 
 Negotiated procedure without prior publication: According to the Directive 
2014/24/EU, ‘Member States may provide that contracting authorities may award 
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public contracts by a negotiated procedure without prior publication’ (Article 32, 
paragraph 1) in case ‘where no tenders or no suitable tenders or no requests to 
participate or no suitable requests to participate have been submitted in response to an 
open procedure or a restricted procedure’ (Article 32, paragraph 2 (a)) or ‘where the 
works, supplies or services can be supplied only by a particular economic operator’ for 
artistic reasons or for ‘the protection of exclusive rights’ or when ‘competition is 
absent for technical reasons’ (Article 32, paragraph 2 (b)). Also, it may be used ‘for 
reasons of extreme urgency brought about by events unforeseeable by the contracting 
authority, the time limits for the open or restricted procedures or competitive 
procedures with negotiation cannot be complied with’ (Article 32, paragraph 2 (c))49. 
 
As in the restricted procedures, in the negotiated procedures the competition is also limited, 
they are used for ‘more complex procurement schemes’ and ‘are utilised in relation to the 
most economically advantageous offer award criterion’50. 
Competitive dialogue procedures 
As the competitive procedure with negotiation, it is a two-stage process and the CA/s having 
advertised the ‘contract opportunity’ expect/-s from the EOs to ‘submit the pre-qualification 
and selection stage information, which is used by the contracting authority to establish 
whether the economic operators are qualified to perform the contract and to select the 
economic operators that are to be invited to tender’51. As stated in the Directive 2014/24/EU, 
‘in competitive dialogues, any economic operator may submit a request to participate’ but 
‘only those economic operators invited by the contracting authority following the assessment 
of the information provided may participate in the dialogue’ (Article 30, paragraph 1). The 
aim of this procedure is though the dialogue ‘to identify and define the means best suited to 
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satisfying their needs’ (Article 30, paragraph 3)52. The dialogue may carry on until the CA/s 
identifies/-y ‘the solution or solutions which are capable of meeting its needs’ (Article 30, 
paragraph 5), then it/they shall conclude the dialogue and ask ‘each of them to submit their 
final tenders on the basis of the solution or solutions presented and specified during the 
dialogue’ (Article 30, paragraph 6). The evaluation is based on ‘the best price-quality ratio’ 
(Article 30, paragraph 7)53. 
The competitive procedure with negotiation and the competitive dialogue procedure are used 
only ‘where specific conditions are met’. They may be used complementary to the open 
procedure and the restricted procedure, in case irregular or unacceptable tenders are received. 
Irregular are the “tenders which do not comply with the procurement documents, which were 
received late, where there is evidence of collusion or corruption, or which have been found by 
the contracting authority to be abnormally low, shall be considered as being irregular” and 
unacceptable are considered those “tenders submitted by tenderers that do not have the 
required qualifications, and tenders whose price exceeds the contracting authority’s budget as 
determined and documented prior to the launching of the procurement procedure shall be 
considered as unacceptable”. These procedures may also be used for procurement related to 
‘design or innovative solutions’ and in cases where ‘the technical specifications cannot be 
established with sufficient precision by the contracting authority’. The CA/s in these cases 
shall negotiate with the tenderers so that they adapt their tenders to the requirements set and 
ensure that the tenders meet the CA’s needs54. 
Innovation Partnership Procedure 
In this procedure, the CA/s shall advertise the contract notice and in the procurement 
documents ‘shall identify the need for an innovative product, service or works that cannot be 
met by purchasing products, services or works already available on the market’ (Article 31, 
paragraph 1). Negotiations ‘may take place in successive stages in order to reduce the number 
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of tenders to be negotiated by applying the award criteria specified in the contract notice, in 
the invitation to confirm interest or in the procurement documents’ (Article 31, paragraph 5). 
The EOs that ‘may submit research and innovation projects aimed at meeting the needs 
identified by the contracting authority that cannot be met by existing solutions’ are only those 
that will be invited to do so (Article 31, paragraph 5)55. The award of the contracts is based on 
‘the best price/quality ratio’56. It may be used for covering the CA’s needs that require ‘the 
development of innovative products, services or works and the subsequent purchase of those 
supplies, services or works’ that cannot be found in the market57. 
The UNCITRAL includes also the following procedures: 
 Request for quotations: In this method of procurement, pursuant to the UNCITRAL, 
the CA/s should invite at least three suppliers to tender, but generally it shall address 
to as many suppliers as possible, since ‘it shall request quotations from as many 
suppliers or contractors as practicable, but from at least three’ (Article 34, paragraph 
2). It also prescribes that ‘each supplier or contractor is permitted to give only one 
price quotation and is not permitted to change its quotation. No negotiations shall take 
place between the procuring entity and a supplier or contractor with respect to a 
quotation presented by the supplier or contractor’ (Article 46, paragraph 2). The 
‘lowest-priced quotation meeting the needs of the procuring entity as set out in the 
request for quotations’ is considered as the successful tender and thus, this will be the 
one accepted (Article 46, paragraph 3)58. 
 Request for proposals without negotiation: In accordance with the UNCITRAL, in this 
procedure the tenders are invited to submit their proposal without ‘negotiation 
proceedings to be published’ (Article 47, paragraph 1). In the request for proposals 
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shall be included inter alia the ‘instructions for preparing and presenting proposals’ 
and the currency (Article 47, paragraph 4 (a) & (c)). ‘The proposals whose technical, 
quality and performance characteristics meet or exceed the relevant minimum 
requirements shall be considered to be responsive’ and finally, the CA/s shall opt for 
‘the proposal with the best combined evaluation in terms of: (a) the criteria other than 
price specified in the request for proposals; and (b) the price’ (Article 47, paragraphs 
8 & 10)59. 
 Single-source procurement: The distinct characteristic of this type lies in the fact that 
‘it shall solicit a proposal or price quotation from a single supplier or contractor’ 
(Article 34, paragraph 4). The UNCITRAL also defines that the CA ‘shall engage in 
negotiations with the supplier or contractor from which a proposal or price quotation 
is solicited unless such negotiations are not feasible in the circumstance of the 
procurement concerned’ (Article 52)60. 
Having made a reference on some basic characteristics of the procurement procedures, it 
should be noted that the chosen procedure for procuring is related to the type of procurement 
and that each of them is accompanied by advantages and disadvantages. In the Tendering 
stage the EOs are invited to tender and the evaluation and award phases follow. 
-Post-Tendering stage: -contract management 
                                        -order and payment                         phase 
 
The last stage concerns the performance of the contract in terms of ‘quality, price and timing’, 
so as to verify that the EOs follow all terms set in the agreement. Also, it involves the phase 
of payment where the procurement has to be supervised by public officials responsible for 
financial duties61. 
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iii. Tools of procurement 
Once the CA/-s find/-s the suitable procedure for procuring, the choice among four different 
tools to conduct the procedure ensues. Both have to be announced in the contract notice, so 
that the EOs are aware of the procedure that will be followed and the way that it will be 
conducted, according to the Directive 2014/24/EU (Article 49)62. There are four tools that 
may be used for procuring: the Framework Agreements (FA), the Dynamic Purchasing 
Systems (DPS), the e-auctions and the electronic catalogues (e-catalogues). 
Framework Agreements 
A CA may choose to conduct a procedure by making use of an FA. According to the EU 
Directive 2014/24, an FA is ‘an agreement between one or more contracting authorities and 
one or more economic operators, the purpose of which is to establish the terms governing 
contracts to be awarded during a given period, in particular with regard to price and, where 
appropriate, the quantity envisaged’ (Article 33, paragraph 1)63 . The way via which the 
procedure is conducted should be adjusted to the type of goods, services and works that is 
why the procurement cannot always be conducted with an FA64. 
Depending on the number of the actors involved it can be either a single-supplier FA or a 
multi-supplier FA. The single-supplier means that the EO is one, but there may be one or 
several CAs and the multi-supplier that there are several EOs and one or several CAs taking 
part in the agreement65. Also, an FA can be completed in one or two stages according to the 
number of suppliers and the stage of the agreement terms (complete or incomplete). More 
specifically, a call-off stage will not be reopened if there is only one supplier and the terms 
are either fixed or not fixed, and if there are several suppliers and the terms are fixed. The 
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only case the agreement proceeds to a call-off stage is when there are several suppliers and 
the terms are not fixed, in order to define the rest of the terms and conclude the contract. 
Usually all terms are defined for the categories ‘that do not require customisation’, such as 
‘office supplies, hardware, furniture or fuel’ and only some of terms for the categories that 
need to be aligned to ‘specific needs and market conditions’, such as ‘mobile 
communications, travel services or software’66. The CA/s may proceed immediately to the 
conclusion of the contract so that the FA becomes legally binding67.The use of this type is 
suitable for ‘repeated requirement for works, services or supplies, but where the exact 
quantities required are unknown’68. 
The procedure includes the preparation stage, the tendering and awarding stage and the 
launching and managing stage. Its distinct characteristic is that it provides for the conduct of a 
research based on data about ‘past spending’ and previous cooperations with the view to 
understand what the CA/s really need/-s to procure. That is why it is appropriate for repeated 
procurement and for unknown quantities, because through the research made they may be 
specified. It allows the categorisation of needs according to the types of goods procured, the 
expenditure and the priorities of the CA/s, and also the conduct of a market analysis research 
that helps in ‘designing tender documents which match needs with the suppliers’ available 
solutions’ and in choosing the ‘right procurement procedure and strategy’. The design of the 
FA follows and the CA/-s publish/-es a ‘prior information notice’ and comes in contact with 
the interested suppliers to discuss with them ‘all of the matters related to the tendering 
procedure’. The execution of the FA should be monitored and in case the goods or services 
procured are of low value ‘they are bought directly without a competitive process’. On the 
contrary, in case, as previously mentioned, there are several suppliers and the terms are not 
fixed, the call-off stage-that is the conduct of a competition with one of the procedures for 
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procurement- is necessary69. The procuring of an FA is mostly done by using the open or the 
restricted procedure, even though any of the procedures may be used70. 
The use of an FA is linked to the attainment of six basic objectives for the well functioning of 
the public administration. Among them the rationalisation of public expenditure, the increase 
of savings and quality, the improvement of competitiveness, the increase of efficiency, the 
development of reliable information and the ensuring of compliance. For these objectives to 
be attained, certain actions are needed. Rationalising the public expenditure is balancing the 
costs and benefits and practically reducing waste of funds and controlling the public debt. 
Choosing FAs for ‘the major spending categories’ and standardising goods and services are 
measures that can lead to rationalisation. In addition, to increase the savings and quality 
means to achieve the best quality of the supplied goods or services in the best price. This 
objective can be achieved by ‘awarding on the most economically advantageous tender 
(MEAT) if the subject of the contract allows it, or lowest price’ and also, by defining the 
‘maximum price’ and the ‘minimum technical specifications’ in the requirements. Another 
objective of an FA is to improve the competitiveness, which ensures more transparency and 
‘better supply terms for the public administration’. Competitiveness is possible by selecting 
suppliers based on financial, environmental and quality criteria. Moreover, achieving 
efficiency is of utmost importance for the public sector which can be modernised by 
simplifying the ‘purchasing process’ and by laying emphasis on e-procurement. The role of an 
FA in developing reliable information should not be underestimated as its procedures permit 
the performance monitoring of the FAs, the control of the expenditure and ‘reliable audit 
trail’. These outcomes can be achieved by grouping and analysing information about the EOs 
and the CAs and by creating ‘transparent and reliable databases’. Last but not least, an FA 
should ensure compliance, thus avoiding the creation of disputes or the imposition of 
sanctions, by complying with the ‘local and EU rules’71. 
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Briefly, this tool of procurement is useful for defining the real needs of the CA/s and adapting 
the requirements of a contract to what is available on the market, by the same time it 
maximises the quality, it reduces the costs of the public administration and enhances 
efficiency. 
Dynamic Purchasing Systems (DPS) 
The DPS is ‘a completely electronic system that can be used for repeated standardised 
purchases’72 and according to the Directive 2014/24/EU, ‘All communications in the context 
of a dynamic purchasing system shall only be made by electronic means’ (Article 34, 
paragraph 3). With the view to use this type of instrument for procurement, the procedure to 
be followed is the restricted procedure, since pursuant to the same Directive the CA/s ‘shall 
follow the rules of the restricted procedure’. Also, ‘All the candidates satisfying the selection 
criteria shall be admitted to the system, and the number of candidates to be admitted to the 
system shall not be limited in accordance with Article 65’ (Article 34, paragraph 2). The CA/s 
shall assess the requests (Article 34, Article 5) and then shall invite all admitted participants 
to submit a tender for each specific procurement under the dynamic purchasing system’ 
(Article 34, paragraph 6). The contract shall be awarded to ‘the tenderer that submitted the 
best tender on the basis of the award criteria set out in the contract notice for the dynamic 
purchasing system’ (Article 34, paragraph 6). The DPS may be used for ‘commonly used 
purchases the characteristics of which, as generally available on the market, meet the 
requirements of the contracting authorities’ (Article 34, paragraph 1)73. 
Another characteristic of this tool is that ‘under a DPS new economic operators may apply to 
join the system at any time, and throughout the entire DPS validity period’, which 
differentiates it from the fixed membership of the FAs74. 
The fact that the procedure is conducted electronically increases transparency and promotes 
the modernization of the public administration. In addition, another advantage of the DPS is 
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that conducting the procurement electronically the amount of money required for the 
procedure can be significantly reduced. It becomes easier for the EOs ‘to do business with the 
public sector’, bureaucracy is reduced and it also encourages the SMBs to participate75. 
E-auctions 
The e-auctions ‘is a method of inviting revised final tenders following the conduct of a full 
tender process’, which means that it is the ‘final stage of an open, restricted or competitive 
dialogue tender process, after receipt of the initial tenders’76 and after being ranked by ‘using 
automatic evaluation methods’ (Article 1, paragraph 1)77. Their utility lies in the fact that after 
the tendering procedure the EOs may ‘submit new prices and/or other revisions to elements of 
their tenders for a particular contract in real time and in direct competition with other 
economic operators’78. If the contract ‘is awarded on the basis of price only’, the e-auction 
shall be based ‘solely on prices’ and if ‘on the basis of the best price-quality ratio’, it shall be 
based ‘on prices and/or on the new values of the features of the tenders’ (Article 35, 
paragraph 3 (a) & (b)). 
It may be used for awarding public contracts of which the ‘content of the procurement 
documents, in particular the technical specifications, can be established with precision’ 
(Article 35, paragraph 2). On the contrary, it shall not be used for contracts that cannot be 
ranked by means of automatic evaluation methods, since ‘Certain public service contracts and 
certain public works contracts having as their subject-matter intellectual performances, such 
as the design of works, which cannot be ranked using automatic evaluation methods, shall not 
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be the object of electronic auctions’ (Article 35, paragraph 1)79. Also, they may ‘be used as a 
mini-competition under a framework agreement and under a dynamic purchasing system’80. 
E-catalogues 
An e-catalogue is ‘a digital version of a supplier’s catalogue’ and it may be described as ‘a 
spreadsheet containing information about a specific product, such as its description, product 
manufacturer, product codes, pricing, units of measure, delivery time, images (if applicable) 
as well as any other relevant information, in accordance with the requirements of the 
contracting authority’. 81  Except for the tenders ‘presented in the form of an electronic 
catalogue’, other documents may also be required to complete the tender (Article 36, 
paragraph 1)82. 
The use of e-catalogues ‘may be “combined” with other procurement tools and techniques, 
such as a framework agreement or a DPS’ and in its positive effects are included the ability to 
‘increase competition and streamline public purchasing, particularly in terms of savings in 
time and money’83. Both e-auctions and e-catalogues can be used as part of the FA and DPS 
processes. 
The DPS, the e-auctions and the e-catalogues are tools that may promote e-procurement or in 
other words ‘the use of information and communication technologies in public procurement’. 
As one of the OECD principles for preventing corruption and stimulating ‘good governance 
and accountability in public procurement’, it increases transparency and competition, while it 
may reduce one of the causes of corruption by limiting the interaction between the CA/s and 
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the EO/s, it facilitates ‘access to public tenders’84 and leads to ‘costs savings’. E-procurement 
innovation should make use of ‘recent digital technology developments’ in the public 
procurement cycle, but at the same time keep the procedure simple to be understandable and 
accessible to anyone interested. Moreover, it is extremely necessary taking measures that can 
protect the ‘sensitive data’ of the participators in the electronic processes (Article VIII (i) & 
(ii))85. 
 
CHAPTER II 
Corruption and Public Procurement 
I. Corruption 
i. Definitions and types of corruption 
Dating back to antiquity and the year 3000 B.C, acts of corruption like bribery started to 
appear. In the recent past, its expansion reveals that it is not any more a matter of ‘a few 
isolated cases’, but a phenomenon characterised by ‘a global dimension’86. By the end of the 
‘80s, the issue of corruption would not only constitute an intellectual matter, but also a real 
issue that the international and national organisations would have to face87. As early as the 
beginning of 1990s, corruption became a field of study for political science, economics, 
criminology and sociology88, since the crime of corruption has legal, political and social 
dimensions (Apostolos Papakonstantinou)89. A reasonable question that may arise is none 
other than why corruption starts being the centre of this decade’s attention onwards. The end 
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of Cold War symbolises also the end of ‘political hypocrisy’ that consisted in disregarding 
incidences of corruption in a country depending on whether or not it was subject to the 
preferable for either side political camp. In addition, another answer to the question is that the 
donor countries used to ignore corruption in countries they provided financial assistance. The 
increase of democratic governments and free media though, as well as the globalisation and 
the engagement of NGOs in the fight against corruption gave room for its examination more 
than ever before90. 
According to Heidenheimer and Johnston, there are three categories of definitions concerning 
corruption. The first one is related to the term of public interest, but after the 1990s it seems to 
play a limited role in the analysis of corruption. The other category, which is considered to be 
the most widely used, lays emphasis on the connection between corruption and public 
position. Among those who define corruption via the use of public position is J.S.Nye who 
describes corruption as the behavior that deviates from the typical tasks of a public role due to 
estimated ‘private-regarding’ (personal, close family, private clicks) related to economic or 
status gains or that violates rules to exercise influence aiming at private gains. The third 
category includes the definitions of the market, in which Della Porta and Vannucci declare 
that corruption refers to the abuse of public funds for private profit as the result of a hidden 
transaction and that it involves the violation of a rule of conduct. In the main categorisation of 
corruption, M.Philp adds the definitions based on legal rules, with Susan Rose Ackerman 
defining corruption as an unlawful payment to a public official to achieve a benefit that a 
corrupt person may or may not ‘deserve’ in the absence of a buyout’91. Another wording of 
corruption is that it constitutes an infringement of law or breach of public duties entrusted to 
public officials with a view to obtaining financial gains, power or prestige (Niki Kaltsogia-
Tournavity)92. The different approaches of the term created a variety of definitions that led 
Heidenheimer and Johnston propose-rather unsuccessfully- surpassing the categorisations and 
synthesise a new scientific definition 93. 
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Despite the different scientific approaches, the international institutions provide their own 
definition of corruption for the creation of a common basis of understanding, analysis and 
combating. Starting with the definition of the IMF and the WB-the most used definition in the 
bibliography-94  they define corruption as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’, a 
‘concise’ definition that includes the majority of forms and lays emphasis on the public 
sector95. A remark about this definition is that it does not refer both to the ‘receiver of the 
payment and the donator’, but simply to the receiver of the bribe96. The TI refers to the factor 
of private gain as well, by defining corruption as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain’97. As far as the EU is concerned, the element of private gain is also present in its 
definition stated as ‘the abuse of power for private gain’98. At this point it is of outmost 
importance to point out that the term corruption in the Convention on the protection of the 
European Communities’ financial interests was interpreted in the Greek law 2803/2000 that 
incorporated the convention, as bribery. In this way, in the Greek legislation not only the term 
is not equivalent to a crime but it also narrows the term to bribery, while it leaves nepotism 
out of the scope of criminal conviction (Dimitrios V. Skiadas)99. 
The OECD is more specific in its definition by including both the appointed and the elected 
public officials, and defines corruption as ‘active or passive misuse of the powers of Public 
Officials (appointed or elected) for private financial or other benefits’100. It should be noted 
that the definitions refer either to the achievement of gain/benefit or profit depending on the 
emphasis each of them intends to lay on the result of the corrupt act. The use of the term 
gain/benefit emphasises gains in the area of politics, economy; whereas the term profit only 
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the economic aspect of the corrupt act101. As far as the UN is concerned, at the negotiations 
taking place for the UNCAC it decided not to provide another definition but simply refer to 
the types of corruption102. A common ground for these definitions is that the existence of 
corruption presupposes an interest for achieving private gains and that the public officials 
abuse their position and power. 
The corrupt act presupposes an unlawful transaction between two actors, a transaction 
between a public authority and a private one that leads to the abuse of power (Maria M. 
Liadi)103. It should be highlighted here that a corrupt act may exist irrespectively of the 
existence of bribery and also, that the abuse of power may not solely be in the interest of 
one’s private gains or benefits but in the interest of ‘one’s party, class, tribe, friends, family, 
and so on’104. Therefore, a corruptive act depending on its means and purpose can take many 
forms. The UN provide a detailed categorisation of the forms of corruption as follows: a) 
grand and petty corruption, b) active and passive corruption, c) bribery, d) embezzlement, 
theft and fraud, e) extortion, f) abuse of function, g) favoritism and nepotism, h) creating or 
exploiting conflicting interests and i) improper political contributions105. The TI classifies 
corruption in three categories: grand, petty and political corruption based ‘on the amounts of 
money lost and the sector where it occurs’. In the list concerning the public sector among 
others are included bribery, clientelism, collusion, embezzlement, extortion, facilitation 
payments, fraud, nepotism and patronage as well106. 
According to the TI, the element that differentiates grand from petty corruption is the level at 
which corruption takes place and the different consequences that deviate from the abuse. The 
former abuse occurs at the ‘high-level power’, with the benefits be reaped by few, while 
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causing ‘serious and widespread harm to individuals and society’; whereas the latter one is an 
‘everyday abuse of entrusted power by public officials in their interactions with ordinary 
citizens’. Political corruption refers to the abuse made by the political decision makers who 
manipulate ‘policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and 
financing’ with the aim ‘to sustain their power, status and wealth’107. As observed in the TI 
definition, the UN differentiates grand from petty corruption by adding additional 
information. As far as grand corruption is concerned, the UN complements that it implies ‘a 
broad erosion of the rule of law, economic stability and confidence in good governance’. With 
regard to petty corruption or else administrative corruption, it complements that it ‘involves 
the exchange of very small amounts of money, and the granting of small favours’ without that 
diminishing the significance of the ‘considerable public losses’ they ensue. In contrast to the 
OECD definition, the UN refers to active and passive corruption in terms of bribery, by 
describing active bribery as ‘the act of offering or paying a bribe’ and passive bribery as ‘the 
requesting or receiving of a bribe’108. Thus, due to the complexity of the term and the wide 
range of the corruptive acts it encompasses, the definitions vary as the focus of their interest 
varies. 
ii. Causes and effects of corruption 
The legal (Jain 2001), economic, cultural and political institutions of a country 109 , in 
combination with its policies and the bureaucracy affect the levels of corruption in it110. In 
addition to the extent of bureaucracy or the application of principles, a country characterised 
by a low degree of economic development or lagging behind in terms of the political 
institutions create a favorable background for corruption111. A clear image of the current 
situation is reflected on the latest CPI 2017 data on corruption (ranked in the scale of zero to 
100-where zero denotes the highest level and 100 the lowest level of corruption in 180 
countries and territories) (Figure 2). As it may be observed, the country with the lowest levels 
of corruption is New Zealand (CPI Score: 89), to be followed by Denmark (CPI Score:88), 
Finland (CPI Score:85), Norway (CPI Score:85), Switzerland (CPI Score:85), Singapore (CPI 
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Score:84), Sweden (CPI Score:84), Canada (CPI Score:82), Luxemburg (CPI Score:82), 
Netherlands (CPI Score:82), United Kingdom (CPI Score:82) and Germany (CPI Score:81). 
On the contrary, the country that is ranked as the most corrupt is Somalia (CPI Score:9), while 
countries such as South Sudan (CPI Score:12), Syria (CPI Score:14), Afganistan (CPI 
Score:15), Yemen (CPI Score:16), Sudan (CPI Score:16), Libya (CPI Score:17), North Korea 
(CPI Score:17) are also characterised by high levels of corruption. Moreover, countries like 
Cyprus, Spain (CPI Score:57), Italy (CPI Score:50), Turkey (CPI Score:40), Greece (CPI 
Score:48) and Russia (CPI Score:29) are found in the middle of the list (Figure 2.)112. 
An effective legal system is determined by the criteria of detection and punishment and for 
this reason the degree of its effectiveness may affect the levels of corruption within a country 
(Andvig and Moene 1990)113. Despite the efforts made at european and international level via 
the conventions, decisions, directions, opinions etc, each country has its own legal rules and 
confronts corruption differently. Taking into account the factor of the absence of corruption in 
the Rule of Law Index 2017-2018 (in a scale where 0.40 and below shows ‘weaker adherence 
to the rule of law’ and 0.81 and above ‘strongest adherence to the rule of law’) it is fruitful to 
take a look at the levels of corruption in the ‘government officers in the executive branch, the 
judiciary, the military, police, and the legislature’. The country which comes first regarding 
the absence of ‘bribery, improper influence by public or private interests, and 
misappropriation of public funds or other resources’ is Denmark (Factor Score: 0.95). In the 
following positions are included Norway (Factor Score: 0.93), Sweden (Factor Score: 0.91), 
Singapore (Factor Score: 0.91), Finland (Factor Score: 0.89), New Zealand (Factor Score: 
0.88), Netherlands (Factor Score: 0.86), Japan (Factor Score:0.85), Austria (Factor Score: 
0.84)  Hong Kong SAR, China (Factor Score: 0.83), Canada (Factor Score:0.83), Australia 
(Factor Score: 0.83, Germany (Factor Score: 0.83), United Kingdom (Factor Score: 0.82). The 
last scores are observed in Cambodia and Cameroon (Factor Score: 0.25), Uganda (Factor 
Score: 0.26), Bolivia (Factor Score: 0.26), Afghanistan (Factor Score: 0.27, Liberia (Factor 
Score: 0.28), Madagascar (Factor Score: 0.28), Zimbabwe (Factor Score: 0.28), Kenya 
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(Factor Score: 0.29). In the middle are observed Spain (Factor Score: 0.71), Italy (Factor 
Score: 0.62) and Greece (Factor Score: 0.55) (Figure 3.)114. 
In addition, the absence of conduct rules for the officials, combined with the lack of a system 
of accountability and of a financial management system are also preconditions for the 
development of corruption. A country without ‘watchdog institutions’ and ‘anti-corruption 
bodies’ or with ineffective ones give grounds for corruption to flourish115 . The lack of 
horizontal accountability which means of ‘some state entities, such as supreme audit 
institutions, regulators or the judiciary’ that ‘control and sanction other government entities 
(checks and balances)’ or their misuse for political purposes may misinform citizens and lead 
to political choices based on misinformation or even to guided political choices116. With 
regard to accountability, an effective rule of law presupposes constraints on government 
powers, a factor that inter alia include the levels of independence and ability of the auditors 
and ombudsman to oversight the government, according to Rule of Law Index 2016-2017. 
The countries with the highest scores on constraints on government powers are Denmark 
(0.94), Norway (0.94), Finland (0.92), Netherlands (0.88), Sweden (0.88), further down come 
Spain and Italy with the same score (0.71), Greece (0.68), Russia (0.39) and the last positions 
are occupied by Turkey (0.30), Zimbabwe (0.28) and Venezuela (0.18) (Figure 4.) 117 . 
Accountability is also linked to openness, another factor included in measuring the rule of 
law, which measures inter alia ‘the extent to which a government shares information’ and 
‘empowers people with tools to hold the government accountable’. The highest levels of 
openness are found in Norway (0.88), Finland (0.86), Denmark (0.86), Sweden (0.85), 
Netherlands (0.84), further down in the list is Spain (0.69), Italy (0.64) and Greece (0.60), 
Russia (0.48), Turkey (0.42) and the last positions occupy Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe and 
Venezuela (0.30), Ethiopia (0.28), Egypt (0.25) and the last country in the list is Cambodia 
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(0.23) (Figure 5.). It is extremely important for the auditors and the institutions to be free to 
exercise their duties independently and for the public to have access to the results of their 
investigations. According to the WJP, when the rule of law is effective, not only corruption is 
reduced but at the same time ‘the foundation for communities of peace, opportunity, and 
equity – underpinning development, accountable government, and respect for fundamental 
rights’ is created118. Furthermore, the absence of meritocracy and of professional development 
within the political institutions, may lead to a low level of ‘a bureaucracy’s internal 
discipline’ and create incentives for civil servants to commit a corrupt act and face dismissal.  
The system of a country cannot be analysed irrespectively of its prevalent mores and customs. 
This means that the culture of a country affects the meaning attributed to the term and deals 
with it accordingly, which can be understood by taking as an example the gifts given to the 
chiefs in Africa which is part of its cultural system119. As mentioned by Gunnar Myrdal 
(1970) ‘a bribe to a person holding a public position is not clearly differentiated from the 
‘gifts,' tributes, and other burdens sanctioned in traditional, pre-capitalist society or the special 
obligations attached to a favor given at any social level’120. It is true that sometimes ‘bribes 
can be disguised as gifts’ but the difference is that a ‘bribe implies reciprocity while a gift 
should not’121. The perception of an act as corrupt or incorrupt goes hand in hand with the 
perception of the term of crime which varies from country to country. 
What is more, the adopted public policies may affect the level of corruption in a country122. A 
common cause for corruption among the WB, the IMF and Susan Rose Ackerman is the 
factor of wages and particularly low wages. Vito Tanzi classifies it as an indirect cause and 
attributes it to the fact that high wages are accompanied by the high ‘cost of losing one’s 
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job’123 that is why the act may be averted, and Paolo Mauro agrees that low wages may play a 
role in the involvement of public servants in bribery124. Susan Rose Ackerman considers ‘the 
role of income and wealth as both a cause and a consequence of corruption’; a cause because 
a country characterised by poor governance and consequently low growth opens the door to 
corruption, and a consequence because the level of human development is associated with the 
level of corruption, as observed by TI125. Low wages and ‘delays in the release of budget 
funds’ may lead to the demotivation and demoralization of civil servants126. Cheryl W. Grey 
and Daniel Kaufmann make a reference to the transition and developing countries to 
emphasise that poverty and low wages in the civil service are preconditions for corruption, in 
addition to the fact that ‘laws and principles of ethics in government are poorly developed’. 
The salaries are low and even the punishment of losing a job cannot be considered having a 
serious ‘deterrent effect’ in committing a corrupt act127. 
In addition to this, it should be highlighted that a country’s development cannot only be 
perceived in terms of a country’s ‘economic health’ (measured by the GDP indicator)128 but it 
is also depicted in the indicators of education, standard of living (measured by the GNI 
indicator) and life expectancy at birth which are all calculated in the Human Development 
Index129. With regard to the view that low wages may lead to higher levels of corruption, this 
may also be concluded from the fact that there is a correlation between the human 
development index and corruption, based on oldest 2013 data (Figure 6.)130. According to the 
latest Human Development Index 2016, the countries characterised by very high human 
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development (ranked from 0.800 and above131) are as follows: Norway (0.949), Australia 
(0.939), Switzerland (0.939), Germany (0.926), Denmark (0.925), Singapore (0.925), 
Netherlands (0.924), Ireland (0.923), Iceland (0.921), Canada (0.920), United States (0.920), 
Hong Kong, China (SAR) (0.917), New Zealand (0.915), Sweden (0.913) and a little further 
down the list the positions are occupied by Italy (0.887), Spain (0.884), Greece (0.866) and 
Cyprus (0.856) etc. Among the countries with low human development (ranked below 
0.550132), Central African Republic (0.352) comes last and other countries like Burkina Faso 
(0.402), Guinea (0.414), Afghanistan (0.479), Uganda (0.493), Senegal (0.494), Rwanda 
(0.498) occupy the last positions (Figure 7.)133. Furthermore, a country’s progress cannot be 
measured without taking into account the level of respect in human rights. As one more factor 
of the rule of law, it should be noted that Finland (0.91), Denmark (0.90), Norway (0.88), 
Sweden (0.87), Germany (0.85), Netherlands (0.85) hold the first positions in the list, further 
down come Spain (0.77), Italy (0.71), Greece (0.63), Russia (0.44) and Turkey (0.32), while 
the last three positions are occupied by Iran (0.30), Egypt (0.30) and Zimbabwe (0.29) (Figure 
8.)134. 
Moreover, corruption is affected by the element of economic freedom and therefore, countries 
characterised by high levels of economic freedom are less corrupt compared with those with 
low levels. Economic freedom, combined with the element of democracy, create the ground 
for less corruption135. As a result, corruption may be the outcome of low levels of economic 
freedom, as well as of low levels of democracy. A country’s political system plays a 
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determinant role in the creation of corruption. In democratic systems-even though there are 
possibilities for corruptors to take advantage of democratic institutions and abuse their power- 
corruption is at lower levels. Also, corruption is a typical characteristic that countries 
transforming from another type of political system (authoritarian, totalitarian) to a democratic 
one often may face. As observed by Hung-En Sung, ‘it is the initial conditions and the final 
achievements of each society, rather than the democratization process itself, that determine 
the shape and magnitude of the impact of democratic reforms on political institutions’136. The 
thing is that it takes time for the democratic institutions to be rooted in the system and for a 
culture of democracy to be developed where citizens ‘make efficient and effective use of their 
political and civil rights’137. 
Consequently, the low levels of development, the ineffectiveness of the legal system, the lack 
of impartiality of the executive and the judiciary power, the ineffective institutions and the 
lack of accountability are all factors that shape corruption. It is also affected by the low wealth 
and income levels, the disrespect of human rights and the low levels of economic freedom and 
democracy. Taking a look at some developed countries with high scores in all the previously 
mentioned factors, it may be observed that their scores in the levels of corruption are low as 
well. It should be noted though that the association between economic development and 
corruption is not always the case, since developed countries like Greece and Italy138 are found 
in the middle of the Transparency’s International Corruption Perceptions Index 2017 list. On the 
other hand, the developing or the less developed countries tend to achieve lower scores in the 
same factors but high scores at corruption. Briefly, all factors play more or less their role in 
the development of corruption and their impact varies depending on the case of each country. 
Apart from the causes that create the general environment of corruption, there is a 
combination of reasons that constitute the field of public procurement so vulnerable to 
corruption a field. For the award of a concession, the interaction and the communication 
between the private and the public sector is necessary, and for the same reason the likelihood 
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of corruption is possible; without that always being the case. During the entities’ interaction, 
‘the volume of transactions and the financial interests at stake’, in the context of a rather 
complex procedure render the public procurement a sector with high levels of corruption139. 
Trying to depict the situation of corruption in public procurement though, it is enough to 
observe where bribes are directed to. According to the OECD, the highest levels of bribery 
are observed in the field of public procurement where bribes ‘were paid to obtain public 
procurement contracts (57%)’140. Admittedly, this refers only to one type of corruption. This 
is due to the fact that there are no data concerning corruption levels in public procurement, 
since ‘the scale of corruption is often seen as impossible to measure’141 and because ‘data on 
corruption cases or conflicts of interests detected in public procurement procedures at national 
and/or regional/local level are rarely centralised or kept in a national register’, while their 
gathering is considered as ‘an unnecessary administrative burden’142. In addition, in this has 
also contributed the EU Member States’ lack of ‘a dedicated authority for investigations of 
corruption in public procurement alone’, let alone that ‘many Member States do not have 
dedicated authorities for investigations of corruption in general’143.  
Corruption is reflected on the political, economic and social level with a variety of effects 
interlinked. Starting with the impact on economy, according to Mauro (1995) corruption may 
affect the types of programs selected by the competent authorities and it is also often for 
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corruptors, as Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) note, to select programs for procurement where 
bribery is possible144. The impact of such a distribution or any kind of unfair and unjust 
distribution is against the less privileged and the disadvantaged145 and consequently, another 
outcome, is the widening of social inequalities 146 . An unjust distribution of resources 
deviating from serving the public interest leads to misallocation and waste of public funds that 
entail inefficiency. It is likely that contracts with corruption in its core are concluded on the 
basis of connections rather than the efficiency of the bidders 147 . In public procurement 
corruption costs the government much more148 not only in terms of public money but also in 
quality149. With regard to public loss, it would be constructive to take a look at the ‘overall 
direct public loss’ of a sample data of corrupt/grey cases, so as to form an idea about the 
impact corruption has on public funds. More precisely, this impact may be depicted in (Figure 
9.) in a sample number of 86 corrupt/grey cases in public procurement which indicate that the 
direct public loss ‘amounts to EUR 904 million, or 18% of the total budgets’150. This may 
lead to procurement of higher prices and of lower quality, a cost that will burden the citizens 
via taxes151. Ensuring the ‘quality and safety standards of buildings and facilities’ is of utmost 
importance for the protection of citizens for example, from deaths caused by earthquakes. 
Especially in the developing world, where ‘sound and sustainable infrastructure’ is a 
component of their growth, the effects of corruption and bribery on the sector of ‘public 
works, contracts and corruption’ are devastating152.  
                                                           
144
 G. Lazos, Corruption and Anti-corruption, Editions Law Library, Athens, Greece, 2005, pg.192 
145
 R. Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, by The Regents of the University of California, United States of 
America, 1988, pg.41 
146
 G. Lazos, Corruption and Anti-corruption, Editions Law Library, Athens, Greece, 2005, pg.193 
147
 S. R. Ackerman, ‘Corruption And The Global Economy’, Chapter 2, Institute for International Economics, 
pg. 31-60, pg.42, http://www.adelinotorres.info/economia/a_economia_politica_da_corrup%C3%A7ao.pdf,  
148
 R. Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, by The Regents of the University of California, United States of 
America, 1988, pg.39 
149
 G. Lazos, Corruption and Anti-corruption, Editions Law Library, Athens, Greece, 2005, pg.192 
150
 Lead authors are Wim Wensink (PwC, project manager) and Jan Maarten de Vet (Ecorys), Identifying and 
Reducing Corruption in Public Procurement in the EU: Development of a methodology to estimate the direct 
costs of corruption and other elements for an EU-evaluation mechanism in the area of anti-corruption, June 
2013, published in the OLAF site, pg.172, https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
fraud/sites/antifraud/files/docs/body/identifying_reducing_corruption_in_public_procurement_en.pdf, (latest 
access 26.01.2019) 
 
151F. Boehm, Democracy and Corruption, Dimensión Empresarial , Vol.13 No. 2, 2015, p. 75-85, published in 
the ResearchGate site, pg.79, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287121488_Democracy_and_corruption, 
(latest access 03.08.2018) 
152 D. Hardoon, F. Heinrich, Bribe Payers Index 2011, Transparency International, 2011, published in 
Transparency International, pg.20, https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/bpi_2011,  (latest access 
12.09.2018) 
 
42 
 
What is more, economic growth is reduced as the investments are reduced (Paulo Mauro, 
1995) due to the uncertainty corruption generates153. In this way, the economic growth is 
impeded due to the lack of incentives for investments and the reduction of the provided 
quality 154 . It is not by chance that in some EU member states ‘economic adjustment 
programmes include explicit requirements related to anti-corruption policies’, because 
tackling corruption may bring economic growth155. Except for the economic and social impact 
of corruption, the political aspect of the consequences cannot be neglected. It erodes the 
principles of democracy, the system and its institutions, by the same time citizen’s trust in 
them is lost and the participation in public affairs is diminished156. This lack of trust by 
citizens is not irrelevant to the ‘High-profile scandals associated with corruption, misuse of 
public funds or unethical behaviour by politicians’ 157 . The culture of democracy is 
undermined because citizens become mistrustful towards governments and their decisions, 
and once they lose trust in them it is easy to distance themselves from politics158. 
II. Corruption in the public procurement cycle 
As mentioned in the first chapter, the procedure of the public procurement cycle involves 
three stages, labeled by the OECD as the pre-tendering, the tendering and the post award 
stage159 . Corruption can take the form of bribery, collusion, coercion and extortion and 
fraudulent practices in any of the previously mentioned stages and may be committed from 
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low-and mid-level public officials to agents ‘at a high level of government’ (‘political 
corruption’) 160 . It may appear either vertically ‘between one or more bidders and the 
procurement official’ in the form of conflict of interest or collusion or even horizontally 
‘between bidders, especially with the involvement of a corrupt inside official’ in the form of 
collusion or bid rigging161. The extent may vary according to the position of those involved, 
but the impact and its effects on the society as a whole are equally destructive. To examine 
the ways via which corruption in procurement may be tackled, it is essential to recognise the 
risks in each stage of the procurement process that may give grounds for corruption. 
i. Corruption and risks in the public procurement cycle 
According to the TI, the possibilities for corruption in the public procurement cycle increase 
in the appearance of the following factors and circumstances. Among them, the appeal of an 
‘emergency situation’ for the accomplishment of ‘urgent purchases’ at the end of a fiscal year, 
when there is no strict control, may favor corruption. Also, corruptors in case of emergency, 
such as natural disasters or wars where the procurement of goods should take place the sooner 
possible, may find the chance to act. Except for the cases of emergency where the need for 
quick responses may be proved favorable, a government may take advantage of the fact that it 
does not provide adequate access to information for citizens with the aim to ‘hide corrupt 
manipulation of decisions in a procurement process’. In addition, corruption may be hidden in 
the use of non-standardised bidding documents that leave room for fitting documents to one 
particular bidder, and also in the use of ‘technical specifications that are created solely for a 
particular procurement or are applicable only nationally’. Examining the way funds are 
allocated in the ‘urgent purchases’ or ‘emergency situations’, as well as the procedure, that 
may allow the use of non-standardised documents or different technical specifications, may 
be helpful for detecting corruption. To avoid other risks in the procedure, the participation of 
bidders and the name of their company should be disclosed, while government officials with 
financial interests should be excluded from the contest. The company should have physical 
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presence, employees and commercial activity so as to ensure that it is not a ‘front or shell 
company’ behind which government officials willing to submit a bid are hidden. Furthermore, 
the more state-owned enterprises participate in the competition, the more likely corruption is, 
since ‘information about shareholdings and managerial control of SOEs is often not publicly 
available’ and therefore, ‘it is impossible to measure the danger of a conflict of interest in a 
given tender’. What is more, decentralisation of procurement and decision making at the sub-
national levels is another risk, because of the likelihood of acquaintance in the interaction 
between the local officials with local companies and due to the fact that ‘procurements are 
often issued in smaller values, avoiding the need for open competitive bidding’162. The OECD 
also estimates that at the sub-national level ‘in some instances, weaker governance capacity’ 
may favour corruption, ‘through for example less developed auditing functions, limited legal 
expertise or low IT capacity’, but adds that decentralisation ‘may narrow the scope for 
corruption, in line with the assumption that politicians and public officials at subnational 
levels are more accountable to the citizens they serve’163. 
Also, the sector vulnerability is another risk164. According to the OECD Foreign Bribery 
Report 2014, the percent of briberies that take place at the extractive sector is 19%, 15% at 
constructions, 15% at transportation and storage, 10% at information and communication, 8% 
at manufacturing and human health, 6% at electricity and gas, 5% at public administration and 
defense etc (Figure 9.) As stated in Article 1 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, foreign 
bribery means “to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether 
directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third 
party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of 
official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct 
of international business” 165 . According to the TI Bribe Payers Survey 2011, based on 
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‘business people’s views’ on the likelihood of companies to bribe (within the scale of 0 to 10, 
where 10 ‘corresponds with the view that companies in that sector never bribe’ and 0 
‘corresponds with the view that they always do’), public works contracts & construction come 
first (5.3), utilities and real estate, property, legal & business services (6.1), oil & gas (6.2) 
follow etc. (Figure10.)166. These data indicate that public procurement is one of the most 
vulnerable areas to corruption and bribery and that more measures should be taken to 
safeguard the integrity of the procedure. 
Among the risks is also enlisted the risk of using the negotiated procedures as they may be 
used ‘to subvert the competitive bidding process and therefore should only be used when 
objectively and publicly justified’167. 
Despite the above mentioned risks throughout the whole procurement procedure, a stage by 
stage analysis of the risks in the cycle will be presented. In the so called red flags-the risks 
that may favour corruption-not publishing the bidding opportunities is among them. At the 
pre-tendering stage, an inadequate needs assessment, formed upon the ‘influence of external 
actors’ or upon an ‘informal agreement on contract’168 or even the ‘lack of transparency in the 
assessment of needs and development of a procurement plan’169 are some of the perils. As 
follows in the phase of planning and budgeting, the dangers have to do with failing to ‘publish 
a procurement plan’, developing one lacking in transparency and/or announcing 
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‘procurements that are not included in a procurement plan’ 170 , or even making a ‘poor 
procurement planning’. In the red flags may also be included procurements that deviate from 
the ‘overall investment decision making process’ or fail to draw up a budget in proportion 
with the available resources and without deficits in it 171 . Regarding the definition of 
requirements phase, the use of ‘non-standard bid documents’ that seem to be tailored to a 
bidders’ qualifications 172 , with technical qualifications ‘tailored for one company’, the 
imprecise selection and award criteria and the provision of licenses to ‘unqualified 
companies’ are some of the indications. The dangers that may be found in the choice of 
procedure phase are related to the ‘abuse of non-competitive procedures on the basis of legal 
exceptions’ and to the application of flexible timeframes that vary for each bidder173. All the 
above mentioned factors indicate deviations from the transparency, integrity and fairness of 
the procedure. The pre-tendering stage is determinant for the rest of the procedure, since it is 
the basis for planning the goods needed in a CA, it sets the procedure that will be followed 
and the typical characteristics that the competitive bidders should have to submit their bid in 
the competition. 
The tendering stage follows and in the invitation to tender phase, indicatives of corruption 
may be suspected in cases no public notice is made for the invitation to tender and the ‘award 
and evaluation criteria’ are ‘not announced in advance of the closing of the bid’ 174 . A 
technique ‘to make the bribing company win the tender is to limit the call for bids’ by sending 
on purpose invitations to inexperienced companies or specialised in other sectors, or even by 
making sure ‘that only a limited number of the invited enterprises receive the invitation, and 
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then put the blame on the mail system’. Nevertheless, to invite ‘a large number of companies’ 
to tender does not mean that real competition is ensured considering that ‘these companies 
may not be real competitors’ (Della Porta and Vannucci, 2001). Another technique is 
exposing the call for bids only ‘for a very short time’, leading only the already prepared 
companies-those who had information-to manage tendering. The companies with access to 
‘confidential information’ not only have the advantage of time, but they also have the chance 
to adjust the tender to the ‘parameters of evaluation, s/he can obtain the contract formally 
without any irregularity’ (Della Porta and Vannucci, 2001:9-10) and bargain the prices by 
relying on information about the other tenders. In addition, a possible answer to ‘a high 
number of companies offering quite different degrees of quality’ and ‘want to take part in the 
tender’ is to limit ‘the number of competitors’ by making use of the ‘short-listing or pre-
qualification’. Corruption may appear in case the bidder’s ‘inclusion on a shorter list’ is based 
on bribery rather than on ‘quality and experience’175. In the list are also included the omission 
of answering to the tenderers for clarifications in time and circulated in written form to all of 
them, as well as keeping inaccurate minutes of pre-bid meetings. Excluding experienced 
bidders for not abiding by ‘minor technicalities’ or requirements such as registration ‘on a 
government-approved roster’ can also raise questions about the transparency of the 
competition. What is more, if the location where the reception of bids take place and where 
they are opened is not the same, if there is a ‘delay between deadline for submitting bids and 
opening them’ and/or if bids ‘are not opened publicly in the presence of the bidders and/or 
key elements of all bids are not made public’ are all red flags for corruption. It should also be 
noted that any submission or acceptance of bids ‘after the submission deadline’ is another 
indication of the procedure’s distortion176. Once the phase of invitation to tender is completed, 
the evaluation of bids ensues. Attention should be given to tracing the members of the 
evaluation committee given the fact that corruption may be found in the presence of political 
figures in it. Suspicion should be generated in amendments made at the evaluation criteria 
after the submission of the bids, in the case there are similarities in the bids submitted or in 
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case ‘qualified bidders drop out voluntarily as the bidding process progresses so that only one 
bidder is left’. As in the previous stage, ‘unreasonable delays in negotiating and executing the 
contract’ have to be taken into consideration177. It goes without saying that any kind of 
familiarities with the tenderers and the acceptance of any kind of exchanges that promote the 
satisfaction of personal interests may hide indications of corruption in the evaluation process. 
In the award phase, corruption in the approval process can take the form of ineffective 
separation of ‘financial, contractual and project authorities’ and the ‘lack of access to records 
on the procedure’178. 
The post-tendering stage, the last stage of the procurement procedure, as already mentioned 
involves the contract management phase and the order and payment phase. In the contract 
management phase, attention should be paid on staff observed taking place both in ‘contract 
award decisions’ and in ‘contract supervision’,179 on public officials executing insufficient 
supervision, as well as on ‘collusion between contractors and supervising officials’ 180 . 
Practices such as amendments after the award of the contract at the ‘contract specifications or 
scope of work’ or even procurement of goods or services proved not to fulfill the technical 
qualifications required at the pre-tendering stage consist red flags as well181. With regard to 
the order and payment phase, ‘deficient separation of financial duties and/or lack of 
supervision of public officials’182 may have as a result goods or services to remain unused or 
to be used ‘for purposes inconsistent with intended purposes’. Delivering them in delay, 
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failing ‘to pay progress payments and invoices on a timely basis’ and omitting ‘the evaluation 
of contractors’ performance’ of the contract and the publication of ‘financial and performance 
audit reports’183 should also be disconcerting about the legality of the process. All these risks 
that may appear in the procurement cycle are indicatives of corruption and distort the 
transparency and the legality of the procedure. 
All the previously mentioned risks will be taken into account in the following chapter so as to 
correlate the proposed anti-corruption measures with the problems that appear in the 
procedure and influence its integrity. 
 
CHAPTER III 
Anti-corruption in Public Procurement 
With the aim to exercise good governance, enhance accountability and prevent the element of 
corruption in public administration, the OECD recommends that the member states adopt a 
series of principles in the public sector184. First of all, it is necessary to define the term of 
good governance by noticing it is part of the decision making procedure and that ‘most 
generally refers to a list of admirable characteristics of how government ought to be carried 
out’ (Matt Andrews, 2008). It is not only a question of ‘how’ but also a question of ‘what’ and 
both may be combined in the definition of the term (Daniel Kaufmann, 2003). More 
specifically, the principles or characteristics of good governance highlight the way, the 
procedure by means of which good governance may be achieved, in other words it replies to 
the question of ‘how’. Except for this aspect of the definition, the term also contains in its 
essence the content of good governance, ‘what governments should do’ to achieve this goal. It 
is necessary to combine the application of principles with the introduction of certain measures 
within the public procurement procedure185. For this reason, the first section of this chapter 
                                                           
183S. Kühn, L. B. Sherman, Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement: A Practical Guide, Transparency 
International, 2014, published in the Transparency International site, pg.25, 
http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2014_anticorruption_publicprocureme?e=2496456/8718192, 
(latest access 17.08.2018) 
184
 Preventing Corruption in Public Procurement, OECD, 2016, published in the OECD site, pg.10, 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/public-procurement/publications/Corruption-Public-Procurement-Brochure.pdf,  latest 
access (17.08.2018) 
185M. S. Grindle , Good Governance: The Inflation of an Idea, HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series, 
RWP10-023, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 2010,  pg.2-3, 
50 
 
will make a reference to the principles and anti-corruption measures that should be applied in 
public administration and thus, in public procurement, which is an integral part of it, both for 
the achievement of good governance and also the reduction of corruption. The second section 
of this chapter will be more specific as it will constitute an effort to find out the anti-
corruption measures that may be taken in the public procurement cycle to reform it and 
release it from corruption. Both chapters will attempt to answer to the questions of ‘how’ and 
‘what’. 
I. Anti-corruption principles, policies and measures in the field of public 
procurement 
For the fight against corruption it is first necessary to detect it either by making an 
investigation based on an ‘anonymous source’ (‘pro-active investigation’) or based on an 
‘official complaint (sometimes anonymous)’ (‘reactive detection’). Most investigations are 
based on official complaints that ‘may come from the community, from government agencies, 
local councils or private companies’. In case it is made by a ‘government agency’ it may be 
the outcome of information deriving from ‘disclosure and reporting requirements as well as 
audits and inspections’. The corrupt act may be detected by examining the disclosures of the 
public officials’ assets, audits of records or even by conducting ‘physical inspections of 
premises and assets’. The thing is that the majority of civilians either by lack of knowledge, 
motivation or for fear of the consequences refrain from reporting a corrupt act. With regard to 
this, measures should be taken to protect the ‘whistleblowers’, thereby encouraging 
reporting186.  
There are some general policies and measures that may help combat corruption, but when 
designing the measures and implementing them, the country’s conditions should be taken into 
account187. Complexity is its characteristic and thus, a combination of measures and actions 
are required, rather than single actions in specific areas. Certainly, amendments require time 
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to be completed and bear fruits188. The states to address corruption should take preventive and 
punitive measures at the national level, by the same time they cooperate at the international. 
The thing is that not all countries have the know-how -that is the appropriate strategies to 
combat it- the resources or even the will. International cooperation can be proved helpful in 
this way189. The OECD estimates that effective tackling of corruption can be attained by 
taking preventive measures190, since they aim at diminishing or even averting its appearance, 
rather than confronting it repressively.  
With regard to the OECD principles of public administration, ‘value for money, free 
competition, transparency, equal treatment, mutual recognition and proportionality’ and 
‘integrity in public procurement’ are ‘fundamental policy goals and principles of public 
procurement’ incorporated in the ‘public procurement legislation’ (Public Financial 
Management Principle, Principle 10, Paragraph 1) and the ‘public procurement operations’ 
should comply with them (Public Financial Management Principle, Principle 13) 191 . 
According to the 2014/24/EU Directive, ‘Member States shall put in place national rules for 
the award of contracts subject to this Chapter in order to ensure contracting authorities 
comply with the principles of transparency and equal treatment of economic operators’ 
(Article 76, paragraph 1). As far as the selection of the EO for the award of the contract is 
concerned, it prescribes that ‘the choice of the service provider shall be made on the basis of 
the tender presenting the best price-quality ratio, taking into account quality and sustainability 
criteria for social services’ (Article 76, paragraph 2)192. Taking into account that the OECD 
and the 2014/24/EU Directive set that the procedure should abide by these principles, any 
disregard of them may indicate corruption. Hence, EOs should be allowed to tender within a 
transparent framework with access to information, be treated equally and not on the basis of 
any preferential treatment or discrimination of proposals and participation should be allowed 
to everyone. The tender should comply with the principle of value for money, meaning that 
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the one accepted should be the most economic in terms of quality and price. Moreover, the 
result of the tender should be in proportion with the aim set, and be recognised by other 
countries as well.  Also, the tenderer should be selected on the basis of objective criteria and 
not on any kind of preferential treatment that generates corruption. These principles condemn 
unequal and preferential treatment towards EOs and may contribute to the fight against 
corruption provided that the CAs abide by them. 
i. Integrity 
Combating corruption cannot be attained without the element of integrity. The principle of 
integrity refers to the general conduct of public procurement officials while exercising their 
duties. This conduct should be in compliance with ‘upholding ethical standards and moral 
values of honesty, professionalism and righteousness’193, and integrity is also ‘the use of 
funds, resources, assets, and authority, according to the intended official purposes, to be used 
in line with public interest’194. The procurement officials should abide by ethics and values, so 
as to ensure that public funds are used in a way that serves solely the public interest and not 
personal aspirations. In this way, ‘the prosperity of individuals and societies as a whole’ may 
be increased. It should be noted that national practices vary, though, since the member states 
are characterised by ‘distinct legal, institutional and cultural contexts’195. The Netherlands 
with the establishment of ‘the Office for the Promotion of Public Sector Integrity (BIOS)’ 
which role is to ensure ‘the design and implementation of integrity policies’ may be praised as 
an example of integrity to be followed by other countries196.  
The public administration should invest in policies that may contribute to more integrity in 
procurement. Laying emphasis on setting out clearly the procurement officials’ 
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responsibilities may enhance integrity197 by leaving no doubts for who is to be blamed for a 
corrupt act. Another way is to incorporate ‘specific standards for procurement officials’ that is 
‘specific restrictions and prohibitions’ and ‘specific codes of conduct for procurement 
officials’ accompanied by a training policy198. For example, in the wider scope of learning 
and development policy, seminars may be organised by the department to explain the code of 
conduct to the officials and how they should practically behave when exercising their duties. 
Training can play a crucial role in instilling the culture, in raising awareness and developing 
the officials’ skills. Capacity building is a way of creating this sort of culture in the 
administration through the provision of ‘induction and on-the-job integrity training to public 
officials’, as well as of information concerning current ‘policies, rules and administrative 
procedures’199. The OECD principles consider ‘regular training’ part of ‘the professional 
development of public servants’, in addition with ‘fair performance appraisal, and mobility 
and promotion based on objective and transparent criteria and merit’ (Principle of Public 
Service and Human Resource Management, Principle 6)200. Creating codes of conduct and 
training the public officials to be productive should be developed in parallel with ‘effective 
monitoring mechanism or clear sanctioning regulations’201 to find out if they are applied and 
impose consequences on the commitment of a corrupt act. According to the EU Anti-
corruption Report 2014, training the prosecutors and the judges to become familiar with 
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‘specific technical knowledge’ related to public procurement may ‘ensure effective and fair 
judicial proceedings’ 202. 
Developing a ‘merit-based, professional public sector’ is also a means of enhancing integrity 
and combating corruption. This means that it is extremely important the selection of the 
personnel to be made upon ‘objective criteria’203. Nevertheless, professionalism does not 
ensure morality, and as mentioned by Gerald E. Caiden (1981), ‘’ In the quest to replace the 
evils of the spoils system with the virtues of the merit system, it was assumed too readily that 
clever people would also be moral people’’. For this reason, selecting agents after having 
testified their honesty (President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency Report 1983) is 
absolutely important and may be done by means of checking an agent’s history, qualifications 
and creditworthiness 204 . Professionalisation of the public service may be achieved by 
selecting and recruiting officials in a fair and transparent way based on merit and 
qualifications rather than on unfair criteria205. Professionalising the public administration also 
means leaving aside practices like ‘politicisation of recruitment’ and substitute them with 
merit practices206. In addition, good management of procurement officials is linked to the 
terms of professionalism and capacity building. Choosing for officials that have the 
appropriate skills and knowledge may ensure that they ‘are able to fulfil their various tasks’ 
and reduce corruption by placing objective criteria at the centre of their evaluation process. 
Investing in their training at the same time may prevent ‘possible mistakes’, improve their 
performance and inform them about ‘the circumstances and relationships that lead to confict-
of-interest situations’207.  
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What is more, the enhancement of integrity may be accomplished by adopting openness in 
public procurement by ‘encouraging an open culture where ethical dilemmas, public integrity 
concerns, and errors can be discussed freely’, as well as by ‘providing clear rules and 
procedures for reporting suspected violations of integrity standards’ while ensuring 
‘protection in law and practice against all types of unjustified treatments as a result of 
reporting in good faith and on reasonable grounds’208.  
Given the fact that integrity is linked to the use of funds in accordance with the public 
interest, ensuring good management of the budget is also important209. With regard to the 
budget, implementing public financial management via procurement planning is necessary. 
The budget should be taken into consideration when conducting the strategic plan for 
procurement, since ‘The strategic plan of each public sector organisation is consistent with the 
overall MTBF’ (Principle of Public Financial Management, Principle 1, paragraph 10)210.  
ii. Transparency 
For achieving good governance in public procurement sector, it is of utmost importance 
transparency to be applied. This principle ‘promotes accountability and ensures access to 
information’, by the same time it gives the chance for ‘small and medium enterprises to 
participate on a more equal footing’211. There are five characteristics of transparency in the 
UNCITRAL model law, as mentioned in the OECD GOV/PGC/ETH(2013)9 Report, and 
these are: ‘public disclosure of rules applied in the procurement process’, ‘publication of 
procurement opportunities’, ‘prior determination and publication of what is to be procured 
and how submissions are to be considered’, ‘visible conduct of procurement according to the 
prescribed rules and procedures’ and ‘existence of a system to monitor that these rules are 
being followed and to enforce them if necessary’. 
Transparency in the public procurement cycle means that ‘potential suppliers’ are treated in a 
‘fair and equitable’ manner, as far as ‘access to laws and regulations, judicial and/or 
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administrative decisions’ are concerned and access to ‘information on procurement 
opportunities’ and ‘conditions for participation’ via in advance publication212 . Openness, 
which is closely linked to transparency, may be defined as ‘fair, equal and equitable treatment 
of participants in the procurement process’213. Openness is related both to the principle of 
transparency and to that of integrity214. In this point it is evident that the principles are 
strongly interlinked and complement each other. Transparency may lead to accountability in 
procurement inasmuch as ‘data availability’ is combined with ‘timeliness, data quality, 
processing capacity, effective reporting and whistleblower channels’. In the public 
procurement procedure this is translated into ‘adequate and timely information’ that ‘may be 
provided about upcoming contracts as well as contract notices and information about the 
status of ongoing procurement processes’215. It should be noted that the EU Anti-corruption 
Report 2014 refers to the Greek ‘Law 3861/2010’ and that ‘‘all public institutions, regulatory 
authorities and local governments are obliged to upload their decisions on the internet through 
the ‘Clarity’ programme (diavgeia – διαύγεια)’’216. At the 6th European Quality Conference, it 
has been presented ‘as a Best Practice’ and at the ‘Open Government Partnership (OGP)’ ‘as 
a major successful open government reform’217. 
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In the context of transparency, information should be disclosed to the point ‘fair competition 
between potential suppliers’, ‘collusion’ or ‘interests of the State’ are not endangered218.The 
issue of confidentiality is stated in the 2014/24/EU Directive, which inter alia provides that 
‘the contracting authority shall not disclose information forwarded to it by economic 
operators which they have designated as confidential, including, but not limited to, technical 
or trade secrets and the confidential aspects of tenders’ (Article 21, paragraph 1) and that 
‘Contracting authorities may impose on economic operators requirements aimed at protecting 
the confidential nature of information which the contracting authorities make available 
throughout the procurement procedure’ (Article 21, paragraph 2)219. It should be highlighted 
that the ‘need for access to information should be balanced by clear requirements and 
procedures for ensuring confidentiality’ especially ‘in the phases of submission and 
evaluation of tenders’,220  which means that access to information should not surpass the 
boundaries between transparency and confidentiality.  
In addition, procurement procedures and regulations should ensure transparency in a way that 
is not complex and does not ensue to ‘red tape’ because the more complicated the procedure, 
the more likely corruption is221. Access to information is an indicator of a democratic society 
and it creates equal terms for the interested EOs.  
iii. Simplification of rules 
The complexity of procedures is one of the causes of corruption in procurement and for this 
reason, simplifying the rules is the key. Conducting simple and clear rules that are 
understandable to civilians may help them identify corrupt practices and definitely it ensures 
transparency222. Simplifying procurement also by making use of e-procurement, transparency 
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and efficiency may be achieved and red tape-closely linked to corruption-may be reduced. 
Also, ‘automation’ by means of e-procurement that safeguards ‘process and data security’ 
makes it ‘more difficult for a public official to step in, or to influence the outcome’, by the 
same time it reduces discretion223. So far Lithuania where ‘the share of e-procurement rose 
from 7.7% to 63% in 2010’, Estonia with the establishment of an ‘e-procurement portal and 
related e-services’ and Portugal with the ‘Portuguese e-Procurement Programme’ indicate the 
decisive steps that have been made in e-procurement224. Thus, e-procurement is an important 
tool for reducing corruption as it may ‘reduce direct interaction between procurement officials 
and companies’225. A public administration that embraces new technologies may take the 
administration one step forward and with the capabilities they offer eliminate corruption.  
iv. Accountability 
Enhancing the procedures of internal control and auditing within an entity is crucial for 
promoting good public sector governance226. The officials should be accountable about ‘how 
they use the resources and the results they have accomplished’ and face penalties in case 
found to ‘have misapplied the resources for purposes other than intended’227. According to the 
OECD, the principle of accountability consists of two elements: internal and external 
accountability and ‘wide access to public information’228. Internal accountability and external 
accountability are two separate processes, complementary though, inasmuch as cooperation 
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between the two enables the administration to have the whole picture of the controls’ 
results229.  
‘Management control or internal control’ is ‘the systems, processes and methods of managing 
activities rather than a specific unit in a ministry or government agency’230. Internal controls 
involve ‘financial controls, internal audit and management controls’ with a view to ‘verify 
whether legal, administrative and financial procedures are followed’231  and provide internal 
accountability.  According to the OECD principles, supervisory internal controls are controls 
that ‘senior officials’-officials of the upper administrative ladder-exercise ‘over the legality 
and purposefulness of subordinates’ activities’ (Principle of Accountability, Principle 3, 
paragraph 4)232. They examine whether the result of a policy and of the resources used to fund 
it are in proportion with the aims and the objectives set233, according also to the principle of 
proportionality (Principle of Service Delivery, Principle 2, paragraph 4) 234. The importance 
of internal controls lies in the ability of ‘detection and reporting of irregularities’ and also in 
the possibility of creating ‘an audit trail of key financial decisions’ that create a complete 
image about decisions, implementation and payments (Principle of Public Financial 
Management, Principle 7, paragraph 4)235.  
The purpose of the internal audit is to test whether resources ‘are used in accordance with the 
relevant rules and regulations’ (according to the Institute of Internal Auditors internal auditors 
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should exercise their duties independently and objectively) 236 , in accordance with the 
principle of legality (Principle of Service Delivery, Principle 2, paragraph 4)237. In public 
administration the internal audit procedure is in proportion to ‘the size and complexity of the 
organisation’ (Principle of Public Financial Management, Principle 9, paragraph 1)238. The 
procedure of auditing includes officials accounting for the use of the resources and the 
accomplishment of the objectives set to the principal of the entity, with the auditors 
intervening in their in-between relationship to evaluate ‘the accuracy of the agent’s 
accounting’ 239 . As for ‘the head of internal audit’, he/she ‘reports to the head of the 
organisation and also consults with the senior financial officer and chief administrative officer 
about the findings of the internal audit reports’, and then submits them ‘to the head of the 
organisation’ (Principle of Public Financial Management, Principle 9, paragraph 5)240. After 
the submission of the reports, the recommendations proposed should be followed by a 
‘systematic follow-up process’ to ensure their implementation (Principle of Public Financial 
Management, Principle 9, paragraph 6)241. As noted in the EU Anti-corruption Report 2014, 
‘the recommendations of the courts of audit identifying irregularities in public procurement’ 
should be accompanied by ‘adequate follow-up’242. The utility of financial audits can be 
found in the detection and investigation of fraudulent and corrupt acts; whereas that of the 
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performance audits in the provision of information ‘on the actual benefits of procurement and 
suggest systemic improvements’243 in ascertaining the extent of achievement of the objectives 
set244.  
A tool of the audit procedure is the use of audit trails. Conducting audit trails is important for 
checking ‘the transfer of funds authorised by the ministry of finance (or treasury) to the line 
ministry and/or to the regional or local office’ and for locating ‘completed payment files with 
evidence that payment has — or has not — been made in accordance with rules and 
regulations’245. In this way, the auditor may verify that the total amount of funds has been 
transferred and check the exact payments made to ensure that embezzlement has not taken 
place. In public procurement the internal auditor has to check that ‘there has been adequate 
publicity for calls for tender, that there are satisfactory procedures for receiving and 
evaluating tenders and that the justification for the award of contract is in accordance with 
national and/or EU requirements’246. Also, record keeping enables inspection in procurement 
and, according to the APEC, it provides justified reasons for decisions taken and for the 
implementation of them247. Auditors, as long as they exercise their duties independently and 
objectively, should ‘recognize and report corruption, abuse of authority or failure to provide 
equity or due process’248 and their role is determining for combating corruption. Apart from 
the audit trails and record keeping, conducting random and unannounced inspections249 to 
catch officials unprepared, is also included in the ways that help detecting corruption. Thus, 
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strengthening the monitoring system within the field of public procurement more 
transparency and accountability may be achieved and corruption may be diminished.  
Except for internal scrutiny, external scrutiny with institutions outside the scope of the 
administration is also important for monitoring procurement. The role of ‘parliaments and 
assemblies’, as well as of ‘SAIs, independent regulatory bodies and Ombudsmen’ which are 
accountable to the Parliament, is to hold the governments accountable 250 . External 
accountability does not take place within the micro-level of an administrative department-the 
public procurement department-but at a wider one. The means of external controls are ‘the 
political, judicial and social systems and oversight institutions’. At the political level, the 
ministers ‘are answerable for the performance of the agencies/bodies subordinated to their 
ministry’ (Principle of Accountability, Principle 1, paragraph 7)251 and the agencies/bodies 
are accountable to them. The courts, the public and the oversight institutions scrutinise all 
'state administration bodies’ (Principle of Accountability, Principle 3, paragraph 1)252. The 
parliament, the Ombudsman and the Supreme Audit Institution are oversight institutions 
which can increase public scrutiny by drafting ‘reports on public procurement’ 253 . The 
parliament ‘exercises control over the executive’ (Principle of Accountability, Principle 3, 
paragraph 3)254; whereas the role of the Ombudsman is ‘to examine the legality of public 
administration actions’ and ‘undertake investigations’255. The Ombudsman having concluded 
the investigations, it drafts reports with recommendations that the administration has to 
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implement (Principle of Accountability, Principle 3, paragraph 3)256. In the EU, the European 
Ombudsman as an oversight institution, independent and impartial ‘holds the EU 
administration to account’ and is responsible for investigating ‘complaints about 
maladministration in EU institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies’ and ‘may find 
maladministration’ in case an institution does not respect  ‘fundamental rights, legal rules or 
principles, or the principles of good administration’257 . Furthermore, the Supreme Audit 
Institution is part of the external audit procedure and ‘fulfils the independent and technical 
public sector external audit function’ (OECD, 2011) 258 . Among its responsibilities are 
included ‘financial, performance and compliance audits’ and the submission of an annual 
report with ‘its findings’ ‘to the Parliament or any other responsible public body’ that should 
also be published (Principle of Public Financial Management, Principle 15, paragraphs 3&8). 
The Supreme Audit Institution has to perform its tasks in an ‘independent’ and ‘professional’ 
manner and apply ‘the fundamental principles to public sector audit engagements, allowing 
for financial, performance and compliance audits to promote accountability and transparency 
over public activities’ (Principle of Public Financial Management, Principle 16, paragraphs 
2&3)259. Both internal and external scrutiny are necessary for combating corruption as it is 
crucial to verify that results of the investigations, for example on a procurement case, are not 
divergent. 
The other aspect of accountability is public information which helps in the creation of a 
transparent and democratic society, where officials are accountable for their actions and 
civilians are aware of them. Public information is ‘accurate, up to date and intelligible’ 
information ‘on the performance of public duties that is recorded and documented is 
considered public unless there are compelling reasons to classify it’, such as ‘legal acts, policy 
plans, public services offered, annual reports, budget, contact information, organization chart’  
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in the web site of the institution (Principle of Accountability, Principle 2, paragraphs 3&4)260. 
Controls and public information create the context of a democratic society where the 
answerables are accountable for their actions and for the use of public funds. 
In practice, to enhance accountability within the administration, governments should 
segregate duties and delegate some officials with the responsibility to approve ‘spending, sign 
off’ and ‘key stages’ of procurement cycle, as well as define their obligations for internal 
reporting261. When investigating the perpetrators of an illegal act, explicit segregation of 
duties and report leaves no room for misconceptions, since in this way the beginning and the 
end of the employees’ responsibilities is evident. In addition, it would be fruitful to align the 
strategies against corruption with the application of risk assessment to identify the areas 
lacking in integrity or face corruption issues. This may be done by making use of the tool of 
risk-mapping to assess the likelihood and the impact of corruption (low, medium, high)262 in 
the public procurement procedure. Moreover, governments have to provide potential suppliers 
with the capability to submit their complaints on the ‘award decision’ and ‘the pre- and post-
award phases’ and these should be handled ‘in a fair manner’ and also ‘in a timely manner’263. 
That is why ‘enforcement mechanisms’ should ‘provide appropriate responses to all suspected 
violations of public integrity standards by public officials’ during the phases of ‘detecting, 
investigating, sanctioning and appeal’ via the application of ‘fairness, objectivity and 
timeliness’264. It is the responsibility of ‘the review and remedies system’ to handle and 
resolve ‘complaints and sactions’ in an effective and speedy way (Principle of Public 
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Financial Management, Principle 12, paragragh 4)265. The capability to submit complaints 
would attribute the elements of interaction and participation to the public procurement 
process. What is more, for the investigation of an illegal act ‘exchange of information’ and 
cooperation between ‘the relevant bodies, units and officials’ is necessary266. Last but not 
least, the interaction between the government and the civil society organisations, media and 
the public procurement may also increase accountability. This interaction has to do with the 
disclosure of ‘public information on the key terms of major contracts to civil society 
organisations, media and the wider public’ to enhance ‘public scrutiny’267. It is also related to 
the stakeholder’s participation, such as ‘anti-corruption offices, private sector organisations, 
end-users, civil society, the media and the general public’ and citizens, ‘at critical stages of 
the procurement process’ and also in a dialogue by means of an ‘online platform’-as in the 
United States- where ideas and suggestions for improvements would be welcomed268. An 
interaction of this kind would render procurement more participatory and would fill the 
process with more accountability. 
v. Rotation of procurement officials 
Another way for deterring corruption is by rotating the officials within the public procurement 
department. Practically, this means periodically changing the location and the function of the 
staff, so there is no time for creating corrupt relationships269 between the procurement staff 
and the economic entities. The negative side of it is that it may take time till officials are 
completely adapted in their new post and aware of the current programs and their details. 
Nevertheless, it may be balanced if the officials they substitute provide them with thorough 
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information about the post and their duties. Rotation does not reassure the attitude of the 
economic entities, but it reduces the chances for corruption in the public authorities. 
vi. Penalties, rewards and performance measurement 
Even if measures, such as the above, are taken to diminish the spread of corruption, they are 
not sufficient for averting the staff from being engaged in it. Evidently, they promote the good 
functioning of the administration but they have to be accompanied by a policy of penalties 
and rewards. Making it clear for the staff that corrupt practices entail penalties, it repels 
officials from getting involved270. According to the EU Anti-corruption Report 2014, the 
efficiency and speed of procedures is a key requirement in combination with the use of anti-
corruption tools, such as ‘better definition of offences, in some cases higher sanctions, and 
fast-track provisions’271. 
Corruption is still present in countries where the rule of law is weak. Countries with high 
levels of corruption have also low levels of adherence in the civil justice and criminal justice 
system. According to the Rule of Law Index 2017-2018, the civil justice factor, inter alia, 
measures the levels of ‘bribery and improper influence by private interests’ in the civil justice 
system; whereas the criminal justice factor inter alia ‘whether the police, prosecutors, and 
judges are free of bribery and improper influence from criminal organizations’ and ‘whether 
the criminal justice system is independent from government or political influence’. As a 
consequence, if the judicial system of a country is governed by corruption, the utility of 
penalties is decreased. Taking for example, countries like Norway, Denmark, Sweden or 
Netherlands which have the lowest levels of corruption, they also have a strong civil and 
criminal justice system (Figure 12. & Figure 13.)272. In this way, in countries with much 
corruption, imposing penalties should be combined with the strengthening of the 
independence of justice, otherwise the imposition of penalties have no use. The EU Anti-
corruption Report 2014 refers to the ‘annual EU Justice Scoreboard and the rule of law 
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framework’ to highlight that the ‘political interference’ in the ‘prosecution services and 
courts’ dealing with cases of corruption is a fact. Interference in their functioning includes 
appointing, promoting and dismissing ‘leading prosecutors working on corruption cases’ 
without transparency and with discretion. It is also related to dismissing or discrediting ‘anti-
corruption institutions or their leaders without an apparent objective reason’ or interfering ‘in 
their management and functioning’273. 
As far as rewards are concerned, public authorities should praise officials whose work is 
effective and productive by rewarding them with ‘training opportunities’, ‘favorable 
publicity’ or even ‘simple praise’274. In addition with rewards, it may be proved helpful 
implying performance measurement and adapting wages to official’s work275. Low wages 
may lead to corruption and, as mentioned before, providing high wages means that corruptors 
would have to consider the risk of losing a high salary, although it is likely that ‘demands for 
higher bribes on the part of those who continue to be corrupt’ occur276. Providing officials 
with satisfying wages, motivating them to perform their duties productively by adjusting 
wages to their performance and also, providing officials with ‘nonmonetary rewards’277 may 
lead to lower levels of corruption and to a more effective procurement system.  
vii. Efficiency and effectiveness 
All the previously mentioned measures have to be conducted in an efficient and effective way 
to be constructive for the prevention and combat of corruption in procurement. Efficiency and 
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effectiveness are two principles that complete one another278 since it is necessary the goals set 
to be achieved both efficiently and effectively. Efficiency in public procurement may be 
defined as ‘the proportionality between transaction costs and time of each procurement 
procedure and its value’ (UNCITRAL)279. A goal is achieved efficiently provided that ‘the 
maximum results are achieved with a given level of resources, or if it uses the minimum 
resources for a certain level of the result’ (Profiroiu, M., Profiroiu, A.) 280 . In addition, 
efficiency of public expenses may be characterised as the ‘relation between the economic and 
social effects resulted from implementing a program and the effort made to finance that 
program’; whereas effectiveness ‘is the indicator given by the ratio of the result obtained to 
the one programmed to achieve’281. Thus, achieving a goal efficiently means that the effort 
made to achieve a goal is in proportion with the outcome of this effort and effectively that the 
outcome is related to the goal set. The role of ‘proper planning and preparation and effective 
contract management and control’ is essential so as to achieve ‘economy, effectiveness and 
efficiency’ (Principle of Public Financial Management, Principle 13, paragraph 6)282. This 
means that effectiveness and efficiency is possible by identifying and investing in the real 
CAs’ needs for procuring and by monitoring the progress of this investment.  
The measurement of efficiency levels within the administration enables us to check if 
measures are needed for its enhancement. To increase efficiency in public procurement, 
public administration should proceed to streamlining ‘the public procurement system and its 
institutional frameworks’ by identifying ‘causes of waste’ and by reducing ‘administrative red 
tape and costs’. Another possible measure that may lead to an efficient procurement system is 
making use of tools such as FAs and e-procurement tools that may ‘improve procurement 
                                                           
278
 A. Manzoor, A Look at Efficiency in Public Administration: Past and Future, SAGE Open October-
December 2014: 1–5, The Author(s) 2014 DOI: 10.1177/2158244014564936, pg. 4, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2158244014564936, (latest access 19.09.2018) 
279Towards procurement performance indicators: Stocktaking report on procurement information collected in 
countries, GOV/PGC/ETH(2013)9, Public Governance And Territorial Development Directorate Public 
Governance Committee, October 2013, published in the OECD site, pg.4, 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=GOV/PGC/ETH(2013)9&docLanguag
e=En, (latest access 19.09.2018) 
280
 D. M. MIHAIU, A. OPREANA, M. P. CRISTESCU, Efficiency, effectiveness and performance of the public 
sector, Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting – 4/2010, pg.138, 
http://www.ipe.ro/rjef/rjef4_10/rjef4_10_10.pdf,  (latest access 19.09.2018) 
281
 D. M. MIHAIU, A. OPREANA, M. P. CRISTESCU, Efficiency, effectiveness and performance of the public 
sector, Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting – 4/2010, pg.136, 
http://www.ipe.ro/rjef/rjef4_10/rjef4_10_10.pdf,  (latest access 19.09.2018) 
282
 The Principles of Public Administration, OECD, 2017, published in the Sigma site, pg.97, 
http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/Principles-of-Public-Administration_Edition-2017_ENG.pdf, (latest 
access 20.09.2018) 
69 
 
procedures’283. Effectiveness may be measured by calculating ‘the ratio of the actual result to 
its expected level’284. The process of evaluation includes the development of indicators aimed 
at measuring the levels of effectiveness and the assessement of the outcomes of public 
procurement285. These indicators can contribute in examining if the goals achieved are in 
proportion to the goals set. 
Consequently, with the countries differing from one another in the economic, political and 
social level, there is not a one-size-fits-all solution for tackling corruption. Each country 
should benefit from the tools that the EU or international organisations like the OECD, the TI 
and the UN provide and count on the international cooperation. Cooperation is determining 
not only in the measures taken against corruption, but also in the exchange of information. 
II. Anti-corruption measures in the public procurement cycle 
Incorporating principles of good governance and developing policies based on measures 
against corruption are fundamental for the good functioning of the administration. As 
important as they are, their essence would be diminished if not accompanied by measures in 
the public procurement cycle. According to the EU Anti-corruption Report, the reason for the 
vulnerability of EU member states to corruption in public procurement is the ‘deficient 
control mechanisms and risk management’ 286 . Attempting a stage by stage analysis, a 
reference will be made on some substantial amendments that may diminish the chances of 
corruption.  
In the pre-tendering stage, which represents the beginning of the procedure, there are many 
risks that may lead to corruption. The danger of procuring ‘similar goods or services in 
amounts beyond the threshold for open competitive bidding’287 may be eradicated by adopting  
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an effective needs assessment policy. Finding out the real goods, services, works that an 
entity needs to procure averts the misuse of funds, while investing money in areas where there 
are deficiencies and procurement is necessary. The consultants that estimate the needs for 
procuring should be independent and without any kind of association with the suppliers. It 
should also be prohibited for those involved in this stage to be part of the tendering stage288. 
With the danger of intransparency lurking when defining the needs and also when developing 
a procurement plan, the entity should ‘carry out market surveys to determine pricing, quality 
levels and suppliers’. Having obtained a clear picture of what is really needed in an entity, the 
development of a procurement plan has to follow. The plan has to be supported by the budget 
and more transparency in the planning and budgeting phase may be achieved by publishing 
‘an annual procurement budget and breakdown of expenditures’289. Allocation of funds in the 
budget facilitates the task of internal controls in verifying whether the funds are used as 
planned or abused. In the definition of requirements phase, it is worth paying attention to 
identifying as a clue of corruption any ‘use of non-standard bid documents that are narrow or 
appear tailored’ to specific tenderers. Instead, it is essential to create stricter conditions by 
using ‘standard bidding documents and internationally accepted technical standards’290, which 
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reassures tenderers are being treated equally and without discrimination or favourable 
treatment.  
As far as the choice of procedures phase is concerned, choosing for ‘the optimum 
procurement strategy that balances concerns of administrative efficiency with fair access for 
suppliers’ by opting for the method that ‘ensures sufficient competition’ is a way of reducing 
corruption291. The type of the procedure should be chosen in relation with the object of 
procurement. The open procedures are ‘generally suitable for routine, straightforward and 
commodity-type purchases’, the restricted ones ‘can also be used for routine, straightforward 
and commodity-type purchases where the contracting authority is of the view that benefits 
will be derived from limiting the number of tenderers’ but it ‘is particularly suited to more 
complex procurement and to non-routine purchasing’. The negotiated procedures are designed 
to have a complementary use to the open procedure and the restricted procedure for the cases 
of irregular or unacceptable tenders and for ‘design or innovative solutions’ and where ‘the 
technical specifications cannot be established with sufficient precision by the contracting 
authority’292. When the CA/s aim/s at ‘the development of innovative products, services or 
works and the subsequent purchase of those supplies, services or works’ that cannot be found 
in the market (Article 31, paragraph 1), it should turn to the innovation partnership 
procedure293. The choice of the right procedure will maximize the efficiency, since it will be 
in agreement with the type of procurement, and it will diminish corruption by providing a 
justification of the procedure used. Particularly, in cases where ‘competitive tendering is not 
required by regulations’, the CA/s should provide ‘clear and documented requirements’, 
justify the choice of the procedure and publish the selective criteria and the contract. As for 
the ‘restricted/selective tendering methods’ the CA/s should consider ‘the minimum number 
of suppliers to be invited for tendering according to regulations’, estimate ‘the maximum 
number of suppliers that could be realistically considered for the specific procurement’ and 
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record ‘justifications if the minimum number of tenders cannot be met’. In the 
negotiated/limited tendering, they should provide a ‘more detailed record’ about the selected 
supplier, as well as ‘the terms agreed upon in the contract’294. As for the type of procurement, 
open competitive bidding should be preferred over the non-competitive ones295. Depending on 
the type of procurement, it is preferable using the open tendering procedure in combination 
with e-procurement for more transparency, competition and for cost-savings. The use of 
electronic means may diminish interactions between officials and suppliers by limiting their 
in between communication. Only in case there is a ‘limited number of potential bidders or if 
proprietary goods are being sought’ and under full justification, should the use of ‘limited 
public competition or even negotiated contracting or single source contracting’ be 
permitted296. 
Regarding the tendering phase, tenders are invited to submit their tender and the critical point 
for the creation of corruption concerns the evaluation and the award phases297. Taking into 
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account the UNCITRAL characteristics of transparency, among them are the ‘prior 
determination and publication of what is to be procured and how submissions are to be 
considered’ and the ‘publication of procurement opportunities’ (OECD 
GOV/PGC/ETH(2013)9 Report)298, the entity should ensure there is adequate publicity of a 
bidding opportunity. Even though there is always the risk for experienced tenderers being 
excluded on the basis of ‘minor technicalities’, the bidding documents should define with 
clarity ‘the quantity and quality of goods/services or scope of work required and the 
applicable time frames’.The CA/s should give adequate time to the interested EOs to prepare 
their applications299. There should be given adequate information for clarifications and the 
requests should not be answered with delay or with ‘evasive answers’300. When tenderers 
have doubts about the submission of tenders and their questions are not answered, they will 
definitely not match what is required. Delaying on purpose is an indicator of corruption that 
leads to the exclusion of some bidders. Not keeping ‘accurate minutes of pre-bid meetings’ 
about what has been discussed may be another risk in the process. On the contrary, recording 
questions and answers discussed in the meetings promotes transparency and gives the content 
of what has been discussed there. In addition, bids should neither be submitted nor be 
accepted after the ‘submission deadline’, but ‘adhere to the established deadlines’. Following 
the deadlines is extremely important for the tenderers being treated οn equal terms and for 
avoiding discriminatory treatment towards certain tenderers. The location ‘for receiving bids 
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and opening them’ should be the same and the tenders should be opened publicly ‘in the 
presence of the participating bidders’. The participating bidders should be present in the 
opening and the signing of the bids opened, so as to enhance transparency by ensuring ‘that 
bids are not tampered with post-opening’. Transparency in the procedure is also ensured by 
providing the public with access to data concerning the ‘bidding documents’301. After the 
award of the contract, the public should be informed about the outcome by ‘promptly 
notifying unsuccessful tenderers of the outcome of their tenders’ and ‘the outcome of the 
tendering process’ should be published as well302.  
As far as the evaluation committee is concerned, the procedure should be free from ‘political 
figures’, be composed of members meeting the ‘technical expertise needed’ and who do not 
have any kind of ‘conflicts of interest’303. The composition of the committee may safeguard 
the unbiased and scientific conduct of the evaluation phase. Selecting the members of the 
committee on the basis of merit and qualifications and after having examined the member’s 
personality and ‘history’ may be proved helpful. Under no circumstances should the 
evaluation criteria applied by the committee be amended after the ‘receipt of bids’. Observing 
‘similarities between competing bids’ should raise concerns as well. Another alarming issue is 
‘unreasonable delays in evaluating the bids and selecting the winner’, which means that 
delaying the decision over the tender may indicate that objective criteria are not counted in the 
evaluation and that they should be avoided304.  
The vulnerability of the evaluation phase appears in the possibility of deciding in favor of a 
specific supplier by rejecting ‘unwanted bids on trivial procedural grounds’ or choosing a 
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tender based on criteria totally different from what mentioned in the requirements305. Giving 
the possibility to the ‘unsuccessful bidders to appeal the decision’ by providing ‘sufficient 
time between contract award and commencement’ 306  indicates that decisions are made 
without discriminations. Examination for possible errors in the evaluation shows willingness 
to correct any possible error made during the evaluation. Also, the ‘bid evaluation report’ 
should be in accordance with the criteria set 307, to be considered reasoned, objective and fair. 
Rotating staff which constitutes the committee may diminish the interaction between the 
officials and the suppliers and avert corruption308. 
Even if tendering is completed, the post-tendering stage is equally vulnerable to corruption309. 
In the contract management phase, transparency may be increased by delegating the ‘contract 
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award decisions’ and the ‘contract supervision’ to different officials310. The purpose may be 
safeguarding the independence between the two phases and avoiding involving the same staff, 
as each phase require different level of expertise. For this reason, the implementation of the 
contract should be appraised by ‘an independent monitoring system’311, in combination with 
the conduct of ‘financial and performance audits on a regular basis’312. As mentioned before, 
scrutiny increases the accountability by enabling detection of corruption and by having the 
public informed. A common risk is not making use of the procured ‘goods or services’ or 
using them ‘for purposes inconsistent with intended purposes’ 313 , which diminishes the 
effectiveness of the procurement and may include misuse of funds. The auditors can 
contribute in this by examining the proportionality and the legality of the procurement and by 
conducting reports and making them publicly available. Moreover, the ‘expectations, roles 
and responsibilities’ should be clarified and close supervision of ‘the contractor’s 
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performance and integrity’ should follow. Public scrutiny is also important in this phase and 
the public should have access on ‘information in relation to contract management’314. 
With regard to the order and payment phase, there should be no delays neither ‘in the delivery 
of goods or services’, mistakes such as delivering of ‘wrong quantities’ should be avoided and 
‘progress payments and invoices’ should be made ‘on a timely basis’. It is extremely 
important to make sure that what is agreed in the previous stages will be followed. This stage 
may inspect that there are disparities between the technical characteristics agreed and those 
applied in practice, as for example the use of lower quality products for a construction, based 
on the certainty of a corrupt pre-agreement that no inspections will take place after the 
award315. The possibility of corruption in this phase may be dealt by verifying ‘that the receipt 
of goods/services is in line with expected standards’ by making inspections on ‘the goods 
against the purchase order and the delivery invoice before payment’ and also by assessing and 
certifying ‘the standard of service to ensure quality’. In this phase it is also important to 
‘ensure the separation of duties and authorisation’ so that they differ for the officials ‘who 
examine the invoice against the goods and orders/delivery note’ from those ‘who give the 
payment order to the accounting department’, a step that may ensure transparency, integrity 
and accountability. What is more, ‘a post project assessment’ may be a good source of 
‘drawing lessons’ that may be applied in other contracts in the future and also record this 
information. It should also be useful to ‘in the report for information management’ to make a 
reference to ‘discrepancies and abnormal trends in procurement’ because in this way future 
mistakes or failure may be averted. In this point accountability of the process may be 
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enhanced by ‘Transmitting information on high-value procurements to the Supreme Audit 
Institution or other oversight bodies’316.  
Even though EU member states have ‘the necessary legal instruments and institutions to 
prevent and fight corruption’, the results are far from satisfactory. It is evident that political 
will is pivotal for the application of rules and the combat of ‘systemic problems’ but in this 
fight ‘declared intentions’ are not enough and cannot bring ‘concrete results’317. 
Consequently, all the previously mentioned measures may contribute to the fair and 
transparent conduct of the public procurement cycle and they should be applied by member 
states so that the factor of corruption is no longer determinant in the exercising of governance. 
The principles of good governance should constitute the guidance for the formation of 
policies, and the measures taken should be directed towards the combat of corruption. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, taking into account that the economic development, the effectiveness of the 
legal system and the political institutions vary, that the type of the political system and the 
respect and application of a system of accountability differ from country to country, the levels 
of corruption vary as well. All the previously mentioned factors are indicators of one’s 
country’s progress but a combination of them with low scores may create the ground for 
corruption. The sector most vulnerable to corruption, with the highest levels of bribery in it, is 
the public procurement sector. Its vulnerability may be attributed primarily to the financial 
interests and secondarily to the increased interaction between the private and the public sector 
and the complexity of the procedure. The absence of data concerning the levels of corruption 
in public procurement restricted the data used in this thesis to the available data concerning 
one form of corruption, bribery. 
The different economic, political, social and legal background denotes that there is not a one-
size-fits-all solution to eradicate corruption. Such a diversity implies forming policies and 
                                                           
316
 Enhancing Integrity in Public Procurement: A Checklist, OECD, 2008, published in the OECD site,  pg.45, 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/41760991.pdf, (latest access 24.09.2018) 
 
317
 EU Anti-corruption Report COM(2014) 38 final: Report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, February 2014, Brussels, published in the EU Commission Migration and Home Affairs 
site, pg.2, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-
and-human-trafficking/corruption/docs/acr_2014_en.pdf, (latest access 24.09.2018) 
79 
 
taking measures that are structured on the basis of the country’s conditions and current needs. 
Nevertheless, there are two basic categories of measures that may be used as a guidance for 
the formation of policies against corruption. The first category includes principles and anti-
corruption measures that should be applied in the public administration and thus, in the public 
procurement, as an integral part of it; whereas the second category the anti-corruption 
measures in the public procurement cycle.  
In the present thesis, among the general anti-corruption principles have been included the 
application of integrity in the conduct of the public procurement officials and in the use of 
public funds. Also, laying emphasis on the creation of a more transparent system of public 
administration is fundamental for tackling corruption. Another factor that plays a key role in 
the proper functioning of the public administration and procurement is the enhancement of 
accountability, both internal and external. The simplification of the procedure should be 
another goal to achieve with the modernisation of the sector by means of e-procurement and 
automation. In addition, the rotation of public officials and the development of a penalties and 
awards policy are some other necessary measures. The penalty system should be accompanied 
by the strengthening of independence of justice and the establishment of procedures that 
promote efficiency and speed. Moreover, it has been noted that all the measures to be taken 
should be applied in an efficient and effective way to bear fruits and in a context that 
promotes report and protects whistleblowers.  
Furthermore, the second category includes specific anti-corruption measures in the public 
procurement cycle. A stage by stage analysis have been attempted to highlight the measures 
that need to be adopted in the three stages of the public procurement procedure: the pre-
tendering, the tendering and the post-tendering stages. The measures that have been 
mentioned were presented in relation to the possible risks that may appear in the procedure. 
Among them ensuring equal terms for the participation of suppliers, opting for procedures 
that correspond to the type of procurement and e-procurement are of utmost importance. What 
is more, the evaluation and award phases should be conducted in an unbiased and fair manner 
to safeguard the transparency and the integrity of the procedure and leave no room for any 
kind of preferential treatments. Except for the measures that may appear in the first two stages 
of the procedure, the risks that may emerge in the post-tendering phase should not be 
underestimated. That is why a follow-up process should be applied to ensure that the 
execution of the contract is conducted as agreed.  
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Good practices, such as the establishment of an Office for the promotion of integrity in the 
public sector as implemented by Netherlands or the initiative of Greece for more transparency 
with the obligation of the uploading of the public institution’s, regulatory authorities’ and 
local governments’ decisions on the internet, as well as the examples of Lithuania, Estonia 
and Portugal for the implementation of e-procurement should be highlighted. Their praise is 
necessary since they are indicatives of the effort made to tackle corruption, while they pave 
the way for other countries to adopt-whenever possible-measures that have been proved 
effective and even more to create their own initiatives that match best their country’s 
characteristics. 
The detrimental effects that corruption in public procurement may cause require that states 
should take measures and cooperate towards this effort. It is the waste of public funds, the 
consequences of inefficiency and lower quality in the public administration that should 
activate the officials. What should not be neglected is that corruption erodes democracy and 
reduces citizen’s trust in their capacity to deal with it and respond to their request for fair 
governance. Also, the responsibility falls not only on the highest levels of powers but on each 
one of us, as officials, citizens, on the choices we make and the decisions we take. No one 
may ensure that corruption may be totally eradicated but the implication of these measures 
may progressively eliminate its presence.   
The present thesis have attempted to analyse the terms of public procurement and corruption 
and examine the anti-corruption measures not only from a theoretical aspect but also from a 
more practical and specific perspective. It remains to be seen how they will be adopted by 
states and what will the results of their application be. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1. ‘General government procurement as percentage of general government expenditure’ 
 
Source: Preventing Corruption in Public Procurement, OECD, 2016 
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Figure 2. ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2017’ 
Source: Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2017 
 
 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2017: Global Scores 
Country ISO3 Region CPI Score 2017 Rank 
standard 
error
Lower CI Upper CI number of 
sources
New Zealand NZL AP 89 1 2,4 85 93 8
Denmark DNK WE/EU 88 2 2,75 83 93 8
Finland FIN WE/EU 85 3 2,84 80 90 8
Norway NOR WE/EU 85 3 1,83 82 88 8
Switzerland CHE WE/EU 85 3 1,71 82 88 7
Singapore SGP AP 84 6 2,26 80 88 9
Sweden SWE WE/EU 84 6 2,27 80 88 8
Canada CAN AME 82 8 1,49 80 84 8
Luxembourg LUX WE/EU 82 8 2,08 79 85 6
Netherlands NLD WE/EU 82 8 2,23 78 86 8
United Kingdom GBR WE/EU 82 8 1,7 79 85 8
Germany DEU WE/EU 81 12 1,87 78 84 8
Australia AUS AP 77 13 1,4 75 79 9
Hong Kong HKG AP 77 13 2,37 73 81 7
Iceland ISL WE/EU 77 13 4,38 70 84 7
Austria AUT WE/EU 75 16 1,17 73 77 8
Belgium BEL WE/EU 75 16 1,63 72 78 8
United States of America USA AME 75 16 3,24 70 80 9
Ireland IRL WE/EU 74 19 3,68 68 80 7
Japan JPN AP 73 20 2,66 69 77 9
Estonia EST WE/EU 71 21 2,21 67 75 10
United Arab Emirates ARE MENA 71 21 6,26 61 81 7
France FRA WE/EU 70 23 1,36 68 72 8
Uruguay URY AME 70 23 2,67 66 74 7
Barbados BRB AME 68 25 3,24 63 73 3
Bhutan BTN AP 67 26 1,83 64 70 5
Chile CHL AME 67 26 2,03 64 70 9
Bahamas BHS AME 65 28 5,39 56 74 3
Portugal PRT WE/EU 63 29 2,56 59 67 8
Qatar QAT MENA 63 29 7,5 51 75 7
Taiwan TWN AP 63 29 3,28 58 68 8
Brunei Darussalam BRN AP 62 32 8,72 48 76 3
Israel ISR MENA 62 32 2,19 58 66 7
Botswana BWA SSA 61 34 2,74 57 65 7
Slovenia SVN WE/EU 61 34 2,78 56 66 10
Poland POL WE/EU 60 36 1,36 58 62 10
Seychelles SYC SSA 60 36 8,32 46 74 4
Costa Rica CRI AME 59 38 2,98 54 64 7
Lithuania LTU WE/EU 59 38 2,21 55 63 9
Latvia LVA WE/EU 58 40 3,21 53 63 9
Saint Vincent and the GrenadinesVCT AME 58 40 3,39 52 64 3
Cyprus CYP WE/EU 57 42 3,78 51 63 7
Czech Republic CZE WE/EU 57 42 1,98 54 60 10
Dominica DMA AME 57 42 2,55 53 61 3
Spain ESP WE/EU 57 42 3,78 51 63 8
Georgia GEO ECA 56 46 3,1 51 61 6
Malta MLT WE/EU 56 46 1,18 54 58 5
Cabo Verde CPV SSA 55 48 4,19 48 62 4
Rwanda RWA SSA 55 48 6 45 65 6
Saint Lucia LCA AME 55 48 4,27 48 62 3
Korea, South KOR AP 54 51 2,24 50 58 10
Grenada GRD AME 52 52 3 47 57 3
Namibia NAM SSA 51 53 3,22 46 56 6
Italy ITA WE/EU 50 54 3,72 44 56 8
Mauritius MUS SSA 50 54 4,41 43 57 5
Slovakia SVK WE/EU 50 54 3,32 45 55 9
Croatia HRV WE/EU 49 57 2,64 45 53 10
Saudi Arabia SAU MENA 49 57 6,14 39 59 7
Greece GRC WE/EU 48 59 2,98 43 53 8
Jordan JOR MENA 48 59 2,99 43 53 8
Romania ROU WE/EU 48 59 3,12 43 53 10
Cuba CUB AME 47 62 2,36 43 51 5
Malaysia MYS AP 47 62 2,67 43 51 9
Montenegro MNE ECA 46 64 2,45 42 50 5
Sao Tome and Principe STP SSA 46 64 5,21 37 55 4
Hungary HUN WE/EU 45 66 2,89 40 50 10
Senegal SEN SSA 45 66 2,52 41 49 9
Belarus BLR ECA 44 68 4,12 37 51 7
Jamaica JAM AME 44 68 3,96 37 51 7
Oman OMN MENA 44 68 7 33 55 5
Bulgaria BGR WE/EU 43 71 2,66 39 47 10
South Africa ZAF SSA 43 71 3,98 36 50 8
Vanuatu VUT AP 43 71 3,93 37 49 3
Burkina Faso BFA SSA 42 74 2,18 38 46 7
Lesotho LSO SSA 42 74 4,08 35 49 6
Tunisia TUN MENA 42 74 3,73 36 48 7
China CHN AP 41 77 1,96 38 44 9
Serbia SRB ECA 41 77 2,8 36 46 8
Suriname SUR AME 41 77 4,08 34 48 4
Trinidad and Tobago TTO AME 41 77 5,47 32 50 6
Ghana GHA SSA 40 81 2,56 36 44 9
India IND AP 40 81 2,16 36 44 9
Morocco MAR MENA 40 81 2,6 36 44 7
Turkey TUR ECA 40 81 1,8 37 43 8
Argentina ARG AME 39 85 2,92 34 44 8
Benin BEN SSA 39 85 4,17 32 46 6
Kosovo KSV ECA 39 85 2,13 36 42 5
Kuwait KWT MENA 39 85 2,47 35 43 6
Solomon Islands SLB AP 39 85 3,71 33 45 3
Swaziland SWZ SSA 39 85 5,81 29 49 3
Albania ALB ECA 38 91 1,81 35 41 8
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH ECA 38 91 2,56 34 42 7
Guyana GUY AME 38 91 1,84 35 41 5
Sri Lanka LKA AP 38 91 1,82 35 41 7
Timor-Leste TLS AP 38 91 7,5 26 50 3
Brazil BRA AME 37 96 4,24 30 44 8
Colombia COL AME 37 96 2,77 32 42 8
Indonesia IDN AP 37 96 3,12 32 42 9
Panama PAN AME 37 96 1,79 34 40 7
Peru PER AME 37 96 3,35 32 42 8
Thailand THA AP 37 96 2,03 34 40 9
Zambia ZMB SSA 37 96 2,46 33 41 9
Bahrain BHR MENA 36 103 1,81 33 39 4
Côte D'Ivoire CIV SSA 36 103 2,03 33 39 8
Mongolia MNG AP 36 103 1,4 34 38 9
Tanzania TZA SSA 36 103 1,55 33 39 9
Armenia ARM ECA 35 107 3,79 29 41 6
Ethiopia ETH SSA 35 107 1,36 33 37 9
Macedonia MKD ECA 35 107 4,49 28 42 6
Vietnam VNM AP 35 107 2,78 30 40 8
Philippines PHL AP 34 111 1,9 31 37 9
Algeria DZA MENA 33 112 2,32 29 37 6
Bolivia BOL AME 33 112 2,98 28 38 6
El Salvador SLV AME 33 112 3,25 28 38 7
Maldives MDV AP 33 112 1,71 30 36 3
Niger NER SSA 33 112 3,27 28 38 6
Ecuador ECU AME 32 117 2,66 28 36 7
Egypt EGY MENA 32 117 4,04 25 39 7
Gabon GAB SSA 32 117 3,22 27 37 4
Pakistan PAK AP 32 117 2,11 29 35 8
Togo TGO SSA 32 117 3,29 27 37 6
Azerbaijan AZE ECA 31 122 5,64 22 40 7
Djibouti DJI SSA 31 122 5,32 22 40 4
Kazakhstan KAZ ECA 31 122 3,59 25 37 9
Liberia LBR SSA 31 122 3,24 26 36 8
Malawi MWI SSA 31 122 1,85 28 34 9
Mali MLI SSA 31 122 2,08 28 34 7
Nepal NPL AP 31 122 2 28 34 6
Moldova MDA ECA 31 122 1,54 28 34 9
Gambia GMB SSA 30 130 6,22 20 40 6
Iran IRN MENA 30 130 3,51 24 36 7
Myanmar MMR AP 30 130 3,91 24 36 7
Sierra Leone SLE SSA 30 130 1,95 27 33 9
Ukraine UKR ECA 30 130 2,27 26 34 9
Dominican Republic DOM AME 29 135 2,56 25 33 7
Honduras HND AME 29 135 2,32 25 33 8
Kyrgyzstan KGZ ECA 29 135 2,59 25 33 7
Laos LAO AP 29 135 5,89 19 39 5
Mexico MEX AME 29 135 1,69 26 32 9
Papua New Guinea PNG AP 29 135 2,55 25 33 6
Paraguay PRY AME 29 135 3,1 24 34 6
Russia RUS ECA 29 135 2,5 25 33 9
Bangladesh BGD AP 28 143 3,19 23 33 8
Guatemala GTM AME 28 143 2,19 24 32 7
Kenya KEN SSA 28 143 1,94 25 31 9
Lebanon LBN MENA 28 143 2,11 25 31 7
Mauritania MRT SSA 28 143 2,41 24 32 6
Comoros COM SSA 27 148 8,87 12 42 4
Guinea GIN SSA 27 148 2,37 23 31 7
Nigeria NGA SSA 27 148 1,97 24 30 9
Nicaragua NIC AME 26 151 1,29 24 28 8
Uganda UGA SSA 26 151 2,11 23 29 9
Cameroon CMR SSA 25 153 2,58 21 29 9
Mozambique MOZ SSA 25 153 2,87 20 30 8
Madagascar MDG SSA 24 155 2,72 20 28 8
Central African Republic CAF SSA 23 156 3,28 18 28 5
Burundi BDI SSA 22 157 3,29 17 27 6
Haiti HTI AME 22 157 2,05 19 25 6
Uzbekistan UZB ECA 22 157 2,11 19 25 7
Zimbabwe ZWE SSA 22 157 2,22 18 26 9
Cambodia KHM AP 21 161 2,43 17 25 8
Congo COG SSA 21 161 1,08 19 23 6
Democratic Republic of the CongoCOD SSA 21 161 1,96 18 24 8
Tajikistan TJK ECA 21 161 2,36 17 25 5
Chad TCD SSA 20 165 2,73 16 24 6
Eritrea ERI SSA 20 165 5,74 11 29 5
Angola AGO SSA 19 167 1,28 17 21 5
Turkmenistan TKM ECA 19 167 1,78 16 22 5
Iraq IRQ MENA 18 169 2,47 14 22 5
Venezuela VEN AME 18 169 1,6 15 21 8
Korea, North PRK AP 17 171 4,18 10 24 4
Equatorial Guinea GNQ SSA 17 171 3,56 11 23 3
Guinea Bissau GNB SSA 17 171 1,7 14 20 5
Libya LBY MENA 17 171 3,05 12 22 5
Sudan SDN SSA 16 175 2,31 12 20 7
Yemen YEM MENA 16 175 1,85 13 19 7
Afghanistan AFG AP 15 177 1,39 13 17 5
Syria SYR MENA 14 178 1,93 11 17 5
South Sudan SSD SSA 12 179 1,56 9 15 5
Somalia SOM SSA 9 180 2,26 5 13 5
GLOBAL AVARAGE 43,07
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Figure 3. ‘Absence of Corruption’ 
 
Source: Rule of Law Index, 2017-2018, World Justice Project 
Figure 4. Constraints on Government Powers  
 
Source: Rule of Law Index, 2017-2018, World Justice Project 
 
  
Figure 5. ‘Open Government’ 
Source: Rule of Law Index, 2017-2018, World Justice Project
 
Figure 6. ‘Human Development Index vs. Corruption Perception Index’
Source: Our World in Data, 2013 
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Figure 7. ‘Human Development Index and its components’ 
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Source: Human Development Report, UNDP, 2016 
 
 
 Figure 8. ‘Fundamental Rights’ 
Source: Rule of Law Index, 2017-2018, World Justice Project
 
Figure 9. ‘Overview of overall direct public loss encountered in corrupt/grey cases analysed 
Source: Identifying and Reducing Corruption in Public 
the direct costs of corruption and other elements for an EU
OLAF, 2013 
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Figure 10. ‘Almost two-thirds of foreign bribery cases occurred in four sectors’ 
 
Source: OECD Foreign Bribery Report, OECD, 2014 
 
 
Figure 11. ‘Likelihood of companies to bribe abroad, by sector’ 
 
 
Source: Bribe Payers Index, Transparency International, 2011 
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Figure 12. ‘Civil Justice’ 
 
Source: Rule of Law Index, 2017-2018, World Justice Project 
 
Figure 13. ‘Criminal Justice’ 
                                                                                        
Source: Rule of Law Index, 2017-2018, World Justice Project 
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